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THE 1859 CRISIS OVER HINTON HELPER'S BOOK, THE
IMPENDING CRISIS: FREE SPEECH, SLAVERY, AND
SOME LIGHT ON THE MEANING OF THE
FIRST SECTION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS*
INTRODUCTION: SLAVERY, FREE SPEECH, AND
THE IMPENDING CRISIS'
In 1859 the United States of America stood on the verge of civil
war. One Southern congressman after another rose in Congress to an-
nounce that the election of a "Black Republican" president would justify
secession. 2 Republican congressmen answered that secession would be
met with coercion. 3 The divisive issue was slavery. Congress convened in
December 1859, shortly after John Brown's unsuccessful October raid on
Harper's Ferry, a raid designed to free slaves by force of arms. Demo-
crats announced that Brown's raid was the natural consequence of Re-
publican and antislavery agitation.
4
Exhibit One in the case against the Republicans was an antislavery
book written by Hinton Rowan Helper: The Impending Crisis of the
South: How to Meet It. 5 In this book, Helper, a North Carolinian, ap-
pealed for political action by nonslaveholders of the South to eliminate
slavery. Although isolated passages from the book were ambiguous and
could be read in a more sinister way, at the least the book suggested that
if the channels of peaceful political change were closed to opponents of
* © 1993 Michael Kent Curtis. A.B. University of The South, J.D. University of North
Carolina, M.A. University of Chicago. Associate Professor of Law Wake Forest University School
of Law. I wish to thank Professors Akhil Amar, Paul Escott, Paul Finkelman, David Logan, Alan
Palimiter, Wilson Parker, Jefferson Powell, David Shores, Harry Watson, Ronald Wright, and
Michael Zuckert for comments on an earlier draft of the article. The mistakes are, of course, my
own. I also wish to thank Jeffrey Scott Tracy, Edwin G. Wilson, Jr., Owen Lewis, and R. Bruce
Thompson and Wake Forest School of Law Law librarians John Perkins and Martha Thomas for
assistance with research.
1. HINTON ROWAN HELPER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE SOUTH: HOW TO MEET IT
(George M. Fredrickson ed., Harvard University Press 1968) (1857).
2. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1859-60) [hereinafter GLOBE 36(1)]
(Sen. Gwin); id. at 272 (Rep. Rust); id. at 455 (Sen. Clingman); id. at 881-82 (a collection of these
statements by Republican Rep. McPherson).
3. E.g., id. at 932 (Rep. Edgerton).
4. E.g., id. at 94 (Rep. Curry); id. at 27-28 (Rep. Mallory); id. at 49 (Rep, Pryor).
5. HELPER, supra note 1.
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slavery by violence and repressive laws then resort to counter-violence
was justified. Here, supporters of slavery suggested, was the blueprint for
the infamous John Brown raid. Republicans were implicated in the raid,
they insisted, because more than sixty Republican Congressmen had en-
dorsed Helper's book.6 Later in the session, faced with an explicit choice
of protecting slavery or endorsing the principle of freedom of speech on
all political matters including slavery, Democrats in the Senate chose
slavery.
By 1859 the controversy over slavery had become the consuming
issue of American politics. A focus of dispute was slavery in the territo-
ries.7 Would slavery be planted in the soil of new territories or would it
be excluded? Most parties to the dispute recognized that the territorial
issue was, as Don Fehrenbacher has said, a skirmish line in a far more
extensive struggle." For Republicans slavery was an anomalous institu-
tion, inconsistent with liberty, an institution to be strictly confined within
its present boundaries and placed in the course of ultimate extinction.9
To much of the Southern political elite this plan to confine slavery in the
expectation of its ultimate elimination was unacceptable. These South-
ern leaders hoped to protect slavery from the long term plans of its polit-
ical enemies by allowing the institution to expand so that the political
power of slave states would remain close to that of the free states. If that
failed the answer was secession.
The contest over slavery during 1859 and 1860 included another
battle: a battle over the meaning of political liberty focused on freedom of
speech and of the press. The institution of slavery had a pervasive im-
pact on law and ideology and, in the years before the Civil War, it under-
mined support for basic liberties of speech, press, and political action.
Reaction to the "slave power's" suppression of political liberty in the
years before the Civil War shaped the guarantees of liberty added by the
Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War.
In 1859 and 1860 the conflict between slavery and antislavery pro-
duced debates on free speech in Congress and repression of antislavery
speech and press in much of the South, including a prosecution of an
antislavery minister in North Carolina for circulating Helper's book. To-
gether these events cast light on how slavery shaped Republican ideas of
6. E.g., GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 43 (Rep. Garnett).
7. Eg., id. at 58 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1836-37 (Rep. Bingham); CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong.,
1st Sess. app. at 136-40 (1860) [hereinafter GLOBE 36(1) app.] (Rep. Corwin).
8. ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 311 (1970).
9. E.g., ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 59 (Don E.
Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) [hereinafter LINCOLN'S SPEECHES 1859-1865].
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free speech, press, and religion and on whether states should be required
to respect these liberties.
The events of 1859 are a crucial part of the background that shaped
the world view of the people who wrote, proposed, and adopted the
Fourteenth Amendment, and particularly its clause prohibiting states
from denying the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States. Because the Fourteenth Amendment today forbids states from
abridging freedom of speech, press, and religion, and because this devel-
opment has had its share of critics, the uproar of 1859 is pertinent to
understanding the purposes of those who framed its first section. Today
we continue to struggle to assure equal protection for African Ameri-
cans. The role of free speech on questions related to race and other
group characteristics remains very much with us. The events of 1859 are
an important part of that story.
Part I of this article provides a broad overview of events leading to
the crisis of 1859-from the adoption of the federal Bill of Rights,
through the Sedition Act and Southern suppression of antislavery speech,
to the debates in Congress in 1859 on free speech and Helper's antislav-
ery book. Part II focuses in more depth on the events of the 1830s lead-
ing to repression of free speech in North Carolina and Virginia. Part III
puts the uproar over free speech and the Helper book in the broader
context of the battle over slavery and then in the specific context of free
speech in the states. It looks at some attempts to suppress antislavery
speech in the North and South and at repressive legislation and the judi-
cial response in North Carolina and Virginia. The section also studies a
libertarian constitutional doctrine that abolitionists developed in re-
sponse to attempts to repress antislavery agitation. Next Part III exam-
ines the uproar over Helper's book in Congress in 1859-60 and
Republican and Democratic ideas about slavery and freedom of expres-
sion. The section concludes with an examination of the prosecution and
conviction of a North Carolina minister charged with circulating
Helper's book.
Part IV, "A New Birth of Freedom," focuses on the meaning of
these events for the debate over whether the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to require states to obey liberties set out in the federal Bill of
Rights. It also looks at the significance of these events vis-i-vis the





A. Events leading up to the Uproar Over Helper's Book
Before looking at the crucial events of 1859, I will provide rather
extensive background, in an effort to establish some of the context that
shaped the debates of that fateful year. The full story of free speech and
slavery in the South and in the nation is beyond the scope of this paper.
Instead I focus on selected incidents from the larger story.
The present story begins with the adoption of the Bill of Rights of
1791-without explicit guarantees prohibiting states from abridging free
speech, free press, and freedom of religion. Soon thereafter the federal
government made a major assault on freedom of expression. Under the
Sedition Act of 1798 Federalists prosecuted their opponents for criticiz-
ing President Adams-political speech and press were thought to have
dangerous tendencies. Although the nation repudiated the Sedition Act,
the controversy over antislavery publications in the 1830s raised the issue
of "dangerous" political speech again, this time on both the state and
national levels. In the 1830s a slave revolt in Virginia produced a state
legislative debate on slave emancipation and deportation. Opponents of
emancipation insisted that antislavery expression was a threat to safety.
Soon North Carolina, Virginia, and other Southern states passed laws
aimed at antislavery expression. The North Carolina and Virginia laws
led to prosecutions for antislavery speech and press, including 1859 pros-
ecutions aimed at distributors of The Impending Crisis. In the 1830s
Southerners demanded similar laws in the North, and the Governor of
New York proposed one. In 1859 some Democrats in Congress advo-
cated reviving his plan for Northern state laws aimed at antislavery
speech.
At the state level much of the present story focuses on North Caro-
lina and Virginia. North Carolina produced both the author of the Im-
pending Crisis and a North Carolina Supreme Court case involving its
dissemination. Virginia was the home of Jefferson and Madison, and of
the Virginia resolution against the Sedition Act, the Nat Turner rebel-
lion, one full scale Southern debate on emancipation and deportation of
the slave population, and the John Brown raid. Like Virginia, North
Carolina, and other Southern states, the legislature of the Kansas terri-
tory also passed laws restricting antislavery expression. In 1859 Republi-
cans saw the Kansas laws as a preview of the political repression that the
"slave power" had in store for the nation.
Finally, the constitutional theories of a small group of abolitionists
are also important for an understanding of Republican thought in the
[Vol. 68:1113
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years from 1859 through 1866 because an adaptation of these theories
seems to have shaped the responses of leading Republicans to the crisis
over civil liberties and slavery. By 1866, when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was proposed, a broad range of Republicans expressed this more
national and civil libertarian reading of the Constitution.
The conflict between free speech and slavery revived the issue of the
relation of free speech to republican government previously raised by the
Sedition Act, but with a significant difference. In this second crisis of
free speech, suppression came from the states, not from the national gov-
ernment. The crisis over slavery and free speech also highlights the cru-
cial importance of the "incorporated" Bill of Rights as a whole to
republican government. For example, Republicans invoked rights re-
ferred to in the First Amendment (here involving antislavery speech,
press, and religion), the Fourth Amendment (involving unreasonable
searches and seizures aimed at antislavery activists and publications),
and the Eighth Amendment (involving cruel and unusual punishments
for opponents of slavery) in the years 1859 to 1866 to criticize state polit-
ical repression that the "slave power" aimed at opponents of slavery. In
this respect the battle between antislavery and slavery replicated earlier
battles for political liberty in which dissenters invoked basic liberties, in-
cluding criminal procedure guarantees later set out in the American Bill
of Rights. 10 In 1859 criminal procedure guarantees were especially perti-
nent because some Democrats implied that the Republican party was not
a normal political party, but instead was a criminal conspiracy.
The 1859 controversy over The Impending Crisis provides a case
study of conflicting ideas of freedom of expression and of the liberties of
American citizens. The debate that swirled around slavery and free
speech and press casts some light on early Republican understanding of
the concept of freedom of expression. Was freedom of the press limited
to protection against restraint before publication or did it also protect
some expression from subsequent punishment? Should political speech
thought to have bad tendencies be banned, or did the idea of free speech
have a hard central core of meaning that protected political speech from
suppression? The Southern rejection of free speech about slavery was not
as unique as it first appears. In World War I the Court found criminal
criticism of the war thought to have a tendency to interfere with the
draft.I In the 1950s the Court allowed punishment for Communist ad-
10. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 21, 499, 501, 522
(Athenium 1969) (1964); Michael Kent Curtis, In Pursuit of Liberty: The Levellers and the American
Bill of Rights, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 359 (1991).
11. Eg., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216-17 (1919).
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vocacy of revolution, although the revolution was not to be effectuated
immediately, but as soon as circumstances would permit. The main
opinion in that case, Dennis v. United States, balanced the gravity of the
evil against its improbability.' 2 To Southerners a slave revolt was a grave
evil indeed, and, as the Nat Turner Rebellion showed, not all that im-
probable. Still the demand to suppress antislavery speech was remarka-
ble and the most profound threat to civil liberty since the Sedition Act: it
was aimed at advocacy of political change in peace time by peaceful
means.
The controversy over free speech and slavery is also an important
part of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, an amendment shaped
by the conflict between slavery and civil liberty. Events of 1859 help us
to understand what Republicans were talking about in the debates of
1866 and what they meant when they provided in section one of the
Fourteenth Amendment that "[n]o state... shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States .... ,,t3 Did they intend
that state observance of the commands of the Bill of Rights would re-
main 14 a matter of state option? Was there anything like a consensus on
the issue? Since the meaning of words depends on their context, the his-
torical context in which section one was adopted sheds further light on
the original meaning of the words used. The 1859 crisis over The Im-
pending Crisis is a crucial part of that context. It provides some addi-
tional evidence from which to evaluate two contending theories about
section one of the Fourteenth Amendment. One theory insists that sec-
tion one was originally designed only to guarantee limited equality of
treatment under state law; the other insists that it was also designed to
prevent states from denying some additional national personal liberties
including those in the Bill of Rights. Two themes run through the story
about free speech and slavery told in this paper-the need to require
states to respect the commands of the Bill of Rights and the need to
protect speech and press even when political speech seems to threaten
grave public danger.
For years many constitutional law case books began their analysis of
freedom of expression with the controversies over free speech connected
with World War I or jumped from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the World
War I cases. Recently legal scholars have begun to look again at earlier
12. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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episodes in the history of freedom of expression. 15 The uproar over The
Impending Crisis is another part of our history of free speech in the
United States and of the application of free speech guarantees to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, a history too often forgotten
by lawyers.16
15. E.g., David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514
(1981).
16. Historians have focused on the issue from time to time. Deeply researched studies to which
I am indebted include, CLEMENT EATON, THE FREEDOM-OF-THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD
SOUTH (Harper & Row 1964) (1940) (focusing on events in the Southern states); RUSSELL B. NYE,
FETTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 1830-1860 (1972); W.
SHERMAN SAVAGE, THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE DISTRIBUTION OF ABOLITION LITERATURE
1830-1860 (1968) (1938). For two fine studies that bear directly on the Worth case, see Clifton H.
Johnson, Abolitionist Missionary Activities in North Carolina, 40 N.C. HisT. REV. 295, 295-301
(1963) and Noble J. Tolbert, Daniel Worth: Tar Heel Abolitionist, 39 N.C. HiST. REV. 284, 284-90
(1962).
A number of legal studies have focused on the historical background of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment with regard to guarantees of civil liberty. Typically these have built on prior work and offered
new evidence and interpretation as well. For an early scholarly study, see HORACE EDGAR FLACK,
THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (Peter Smith 1965) (1908). For two pioneer-
ing studies of antislavery influence, see HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION
(1968) and JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (enlarged ed. 1965). Both examined anti-
slavery origins of the Fourteenth Amendment. Crosskey built on their insights and added powerful
additional research and analysis in William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative His-
tory, "and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954). Analysis
of the issue was further advanced in Alfred Avins, Incorporation of the Bill of Right&" The Crosskey-
Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1968) and Robert J. Kaczorowski, Searching
for the Intent of the Framers of Fourteenth Amendment, 5 CONN. L. REV. 368 (1972-73). RICHARD
H. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERY POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 1837-1860
(1976) provides an excellent survey of the rise of the political antislavery movement. For a very
important study of early antislavery legal thought, see WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF
ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977).
My own work was heavily influenced by Crosskey and my understanding of the subject evolved
over time. See Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to
Professor Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45 (1980) [hereinafter A Reply to Professor Berger];
Michael Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 14 CONN. L. REV. 237
(1982); Michael Kent Curtis, Further Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1982). For a critique of Mr. Berger's work,
see Aviam Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights" A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV.
651 (1979).
For an overview of this period of American legal history and significant additional analysis of
the meaning of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, see HAROLD M. HYMAN & WIL-
LIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at
386-438 (1982). See also Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Four-
teenth Amendment, I CONST. COMMENTARY 235 (1984). A broad history and critical analysis of
the incorporation issue appears in MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986) [hereinafter CURTIS, No STATE
SHALL ABRIDGE]. A very important and insightful article by Akhil Amar has added still more
evidence and fresh interpretation. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992). A still more recent and important article by Richard
Aynes is a powerful answer to the ad hominem attacks on Bingham which, unhappily, have been too
prominent in discussion of the incorporation issue. See Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman and
John Bingham's Not-So "Singular" View of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 103
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 1993).
For important scholarship denying application of the Bill of Rights to the States under the
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
B. Freedom of Speech and the Press
1. The First Bill of Rights
By the time of the American revolution, American revolutionaries
appealed to the basic rights of Englishmen, including habeas corpus, jury
trials, protection against ex post facto laws and unreasonable searches,
and other procedural rights. They also appealed to freedom of speech,
press, and religion, and the right to counsel. These appeared in bills of
rights in many state constitutions. The omission of many of these basic
rights from the American Constitution was one of the major arguments
against its adoption.
When James Madison proposed the Bill of Rights in 1789, he cau-
tiously expressed his expectation for the role to be played by guarantees
of liberty. Madison hoped the Bill of Rights would limit abuses of power
by the legislature, the executive, and most of all by the majority against
the minority. By declaring guarantees of liberty, a bill of rights would
have "a tendency to impress some degree of respect for them, to establish
the public opinion in their favor."'17 The judiciary would "consider
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will
be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power."'18
Madison noted that in the British system declarations of rights "have
gone no farther than to raise a barrier against the Crown; the power of
the legislature is left altogether indefinite .... The freedom of the press
and rights of conscience, those choicest privileges of the people, are un-
Fourteenth Amendment, see RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS (1989) and WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988). Scholars who have concluded that incorporation was
intended have included writers of all political persuasions. In addition to Professor Avins, the most
recent "conservative" to support incorporation is EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITU-
TION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869 (1990). Most students of the subject who have studied it in detail
have concluded that some form of application to the states of all constitutional guarantees of per-
sonal liberty was probably intended by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. These include
Flack, Crosskey, Avins, Curtis, Hyman and Wiecek, Kaczorowski, Maltz, Amar, and Aynes. Ber-
ger and Nelson deny any incorporation. Fairman, TenBroek, Guminski, and Graham opt for some
form of selective incorporation. Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the
Bill of Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Arnold T. Guminski, The
Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of the American People: A Disjunctive Theory of Selective Incorpo-
ration of the Bill of Rights, 7 WHIrrIER L. REV. 765 (1985). For a lively popular history of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see HOWARD N. MEYER, THE AMENDMENT THAT REFUSED TO DIE
(rev. ed., Beacon Press 1978) (1973).
17. 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1030 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (Madison in the first Congress).
18. Id. at 1031. For recent commentary, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Consti-
tution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991); Paul Finkelman, The Ten Amendments as a Declaration of
Rights, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 351 (1992); Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A
Reluctant Paternity, 1990 Sup. CT. REV. 301 (1990).
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guarded in the British constitution."' 19
In addition to the rights that did make it into the Bill of Rights,
Madison had also proposed "that no State shall violate the equal right of
conscience, freedom of the press, or trial by jury in criminal cases."
'20
"[E]very Government should be disarmed," he insisted, "of powers
which trench on those particular rights."' 21 Though some state constitu-
tions secured the rights, there was no reason not to have "a double secur-
ity on those points."' 22 "State Governments," Madison said, "are as
liable to attack the invaluable privileges as the General Government
is. .... -23 When a critic suggested that the matter should be left to the
states, Madison responded that the limitation on the states was "the most
valuable amendment in the whole list."'24 While Congress accepted most
of Madison's proposals, the Senate rejected his proposal for explicit limi-
tation on the states. The Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court ruled in
1833, did not limit state or local governments.
25
2. The Sedition Act
The Sedition Act of 1798 put the Bill of Rights to its first major
test.26 The Act made it a crime falsely and maliciously to criticize the
president. Political motives for the Act were clear: it protected the Presi-
dent, John Adams, from criticism, but not the Vice President, Thomas
Jefferson, his likely opponent in the election of 1800. The act was set to
expire by the time the new President was in office. Federalists used the
act to prosecute supporters of Thomas Jefferson for political criticisms of
President Adams.
27
Much of the Jeffersonian attack on the Sedition Act was based on
federalism: the Constitution gave Congress no power over speech and
press and the First Amendment explicitly denied such power. The Vir-
ginia Resolutions, penned by Madison, made a more fundamental criti-
cism: the Sedition Act should "produce universal alarm, because it is
levelled against that right of freely examining public characters and
measures, and of free communication among the people thereon, which
19. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 17, at 1028 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 1033.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 1113.
25. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
26. 1 Stat. 596-97 (1798).
27. JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1966).
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has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other
right."' 28 Charles Black says such an argument is structural: a conclusion
drawn from how republican governments have to function to fulfill their
design.29 The argument suggested an area of political speech that should
be beyond the power of government to suppress. This response to the
Sedition Act built on and elaborated the Leveller and Radical Whig tra-
dition. By that tradition the people were the master, government officials
were the agent, and free speech was an essential mechanism by which the
master could control the agent.30 While Blackstone's Commentaries, the
leading English text, defended Parliamentary sovereignty and the idea
that freedom of the press was limited to a protection against prior re-
straint, 31 the attack on the Sedition Act emphasized popular sovereignty
and a broad concomitant right to criticize government measures and offi-
cials. Although the federal courts sustained the Act,3 2 Jefferson was
elected president, the Sedition Act expired, and Jefferson pardoned those
convicted under it.
The consensus that emerged from the controversy over the Sedition
Act recognized basic Bill of Rights liberties as fundamental freedoms of
American citizens. These fundamental freedoms, like free speech and
free press, were protected from federal invasion by the national Bill of
Rights. As against state action, these and other guarantees of liberty
were thought by many to be protected by state constitutions and state
bills of rights. Most of the state and federal rights were criminal proce-
dure guarantees, a recognition that those in power are tempted to use the
criminal law to suppress their political opponents. The First Amend-
ment to the federal Constitution assumed a pre-existing freedom of
speech and of the press and enjoined Congress not to abridge it.33 The
assumption that the rights of the people were adequately protected by the
Bill of Rights as against the federal government and by state guarantees
28. Virginia Resolutions, Dec. 21, 1798, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 159, 160 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1989).
29. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9-
15, 40-42 (1969).
30. See, e.g., JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, 1 CATO'S LETrERS: ESSAYS ON LIB-
ERTY, CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 96-103, 249-50, 253 (Da Capo
Press 1971) (1755); Curtis, supra note 10, at 367-68; David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian:
Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795, 823
(1985). For early understandings of free speech, see also DONNA L. DICKERSON, THE COURSE OF
TOLERANCE (1990); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985); David A.
Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983).
31. 4 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 151-52
(1825).
32. Eg., United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865).
33. Amar, supra note 16, at 1207.
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as against state governments suffered repeated shocks in the crusade
against slavery.
II. THE END OF THE CONSENSUS: REPRESSION OF
FREE SPEECH IN THE SOUTH
A. A More Radical Attack on Slavery and A More Radical Response
Slaveholders were of two minds about slavery. On the one hand,
they professed and often believed that the relation between themselves
and their slaves was one of paternal affection. 34 On the other, they said
they feared their slaves could be led to revolt and cut their throats. News
of incendiary pamphlets and graver threats such as slave revolts and re-
bellions dramatically heightened slaveholders' anxiety about their safety.
An 1829 pamphlet by David Walker, a Massachusetts black, urged slaves
to revolt. Walker managed to send his pamphlet into several Southern
states. In 1830 copies appeared in Wilmington, North Carolina. In 1831
William Lloyd Garrison began publishing the Liberator, a radical anti-
slavery newspaper. Though Garrison did not advocate violence, he did
send his harsh denunciations of slavery and slaveholders to the South,
unsolicited. Nat Turner, a Virginia slave, led a slave revolt in 1831, kill-
ing sixty whites before his insurrection was suppressed.
35
Immediate Southern reaction to such events was close to hysteria.
After the Nat Turner rebellion Virginians suffered, as one delegate to the
Virginia Assembly put it, from "the suspicion that a Nat Turner might
be in every family, that the same bloody deed could be acted over at any
time and in any place .... -36 The very omnipresence of slave servants
added to the danger. Still, recommendations for action were mixed. The
first reaction was repression, often aimed at slaves and free Negroes. Af-
ter the Walker pamphlet, North Carolina, like some other Southern
states, made it a crime to teach slaves to read or write. It provided for
quarantine of free blacks sailors on ships entering its ports.3 7 It also
banned publications with the tendency to excite insurrection, conspiracy,
or resistance in slaves.38 Other Southern states passed similar laws. In
34. EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDON, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 97-99,
102-03, 105-12 (1976).
35. EATON, supra note 16, at 89-117.
36. James M'Dowell, Jr. (of Rockbridge), Speech in the House of Delegates of Virginia, on The
Slave Question 29 (Jan. 21, 1832) (copy on file with author).
37. 1831 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 30. See also Paul Finkelman, States' Rights North and South in
Antebellum America, in AN UNCERTAIN TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF
THE SOUTH 125, 130-33 (Kermit L. Hall & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1989).
38. Act to Prevent Circulation of Seditious Publications, ch. 5, 1830 N.C. Sess. Laws 10 (codi-
fied at N.C. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 17 (1837)).
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Virginia, after the Nat Turner rebellion, the legislature also considered
repressive measures. Remarkably, however, the rebellion also led to a
legislative attempt gradually to end slavery in Virginia and to provide for
colonization of emancipated slaves. Nat Turner's revolt provided an oc-
casion for Virginia egalitarians, mostly from the Piedmont and west, to
attack slavery, an institution concentrated in the east. Ridding the state
of slavery could also undermine the disproportionate political power (if
one white man one vote was the standard) of the slaveholding east.
B. The Virginia Emancipation Debate of 1832:
A Dress Rehearsalfor 1859?
There are some remarkable similarities between the controversy
over emancipation in Virginia and the later controversy that swirled
around slavery and Helper's book in 1859. Just as the national debate on
slavery became increasingly sectional, the divisions in Virginia were
largely, though not entirely, sectional. Delegates from west of the Blue
Ridge Mountains tended to favor emancipation and colonization (depor-
tation); those from the heavily slaveholding counties of the east tended to
oppose it.39 Slave counties in Virginia were over-represented in the Vir-
ginia legislature, if representation were to be based on their white
population.
Slaveholding areas were also over-represented, by virtue of the
three-fifths clause, in the federal House of Representatives. 40 So locally
and nationally slaveholders came to controversies over slavery with ad-
ded political power.
Republicans supported banning slavery from the territories. In 1832
a delegate from Western Virginia suggested the desirability of banning
slavery from the western part of the state. 41 Like Helper in the late
1850s, supporters of gradual emancipation in the Virginia legislature
based their argument more on the safety and economic well-being of the
39. CHARLES S. SYDNOR, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN SECTIONALISM 1819-1848, at
228 (1962). For a fine brief modern account of events in Virginia and later efforts at emancipation in
Delaware and Maryland, see WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS
AT BAY 1776-1854, at 162-210 (1990) [hereinafter FREEHLING, ROAD TO DISUNION]. For a de-
tailed modern study, see ALISON G. FREEHLING, DRIFT TOWARDS DISSOLUTION: THE VIRGINIA
SLAVERY DEBATE OF 1831-1832 (1982).
40. SYDNOR, supra note 39, at 228. Some Southern states based representation in part on "fed-
eral population," incorporating the three-fifths clause by reference. Such provisions swelled the rep-
resentation of slaveholders. E.g., Amendments to the Constitution, 1836 PROCEEDINGS AND
DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF NORTH-CAROLINA, CALLED TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE app. at 419 (representation in the House of Commons to be based on "federal
population").
41. Charles Jas. Faulkner (of Berkeley), Speech in House of Delegates of Virginia, on the Policy
of the State with respect to Her Slave Population 9 (Jan. 20, 1832) (copy on file with author).
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white community than on concern for the rights of the slave. Slavery,
the Virginians argued, endangered whites, threatening them with slave
revolts. It discouraged white artisans and mechanics from working in
the state and produced white flight and economic backwardness. 42 As
Helper later would, the Virginia emancipationists suggested that aboli-
tion of slavery was justified by the power of government to abate nui-
sances. Indeed, analogies to slavery ranged from mad dogs to diseased
cargoes on ships.43 The list of practical dangers was capped with the
prescient claim that slavery was producing sectional parties and was con-
tributing to the future dismemberment of the Union. 44 For Virginia's
supporters of emancipation, quarantining blacks on ships and prohibiting
teaching slaves to read would not cure the problem. The South was try-
ing to cure cancer with a band aid.
In addition to practical arguments against slavery, one Virginia
delegate questioned whether slavery was not "the most striking [in-
stance] upon record, of a people resolutely violating towards others, that
principle of absolute freedom on which they erected their own indepen-
dence .... -145 Finally some Virginia emancipationists appealed to the
humanity of the slave. 46 One major difference between the Virginia de-
bate of 1832 and the Congressional debate of 1859 is the increased ex-
pression of humanitarian concern for the slaves in Congress in 1859.
Still, in 1859 leading Republicans saw colonization as the next step after
emancipation, and supported it for free blacks as well as slaves.
47
While in 1832 an important segment of the political elite and estab-
lishment press in Virginia made calls for an end to slavery in the state, by
1859 the press and political elite in Virginia and North Carolina treated
very similar appeals by Hinton Helper as criminal. Though the Virginia
rhetoric was at times radical, the proposals of the 1832 Virginia emanci-
pationists were more moderate: one resolution provided that emancipa-
tion of all slaves born after 1840 be submitted to the voters. The
42. E.g., id. at 9-14; Philip A. Boiling (of Buckingham), Speech in the House of Delegates of
Virginia, on the Policy of the State in relation to Her Colored Population 13 (2d ed. Jan. 25, 1832) in
SLAVERY SOURCE MATERIAL AND CRITICAL LITERATURE (Louisville, Ky., Lost Cause Press)
(Microfiche Reprint SLA 185 (1971)); John A. Chandler (of Norfolk County), Speech in the House
of Delegates of Virginia, on the Policy of the State with respect to Her Slave Population 6-7 (Jan. 17,
1832) in COLLECTION OF ANTI-SLAVERY PROPAGANDA IN OBERLIN COLLEGE LIBRARY (Louis-
ville, Ky., Lost Cause Press) (Microfiche Reprint SLB 826 (1964)); Thomas J. Randolph (of Al-
bemarle), Speech in the House of Delegates of Virginia, on the Abolition of Slavery 7 (2d ed. Jan. 2 1,
1832) (copy on file with author).
43. See Chandler, supra note 42, at 6; Randolph, supra note 42, at 7.
44. M'Dowell, supra note 36, at 21.
45. Id. at 5.
46. Faulkner, supra note 41, at 18.
47. GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 60 (Sen. Trumbull) (favoring "deportation" of free blacks).
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proposal for gradual emancipation did not necessarily assure freedom for
all slaves, though it would free Virginia from slavery. Gradual emanci-
pation left open the possibility that slaves could be sold to the deep South
before the date for emancipation arrived.
48
The Virginia emancipationist-colonizationist attack was answered
with an appeal to the rights of private property, including an invocation
of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against taking private property for
public use without just compensation. Emancipationists answered that
the right to private property was limited. It did not include the right to
compensation when property endangered the community or was a nui-
sance. 49 John Chandler, delegate from Norfolk County, suggested that
slave owners had a questionable title to their slaves. Since liberty "right-
fully, cannot be converted into slavery, may I not question whether the
title of the master to the slave is absolute. . . . 10 The original American
owners of the slaves were receivers of stolen goods; passage of time did
not improve the title of their descendants.5 ' In spite of legislative enact-
ments, Chandler thought title to slaves remained dubious.
52
The proposals and, to a far greater degree, the logic of the emanci-
pationists seemed to threaten powerful economic interests of slavehold-
ers. A pamphlet by "Appomattox" came to the defense of the institution
of slavery. Appomattox cited, with a mixture of horror and sarcasm,
some statements by proponents of abolition:
The gentleman who opened the debate... was very, very moderate: he
only referred to the declaration in the bill of rights that all men are by
nature free and equal, and applying it to our slaves, said, "It was a
truth held sacred by every American and by every republican through-
out the world." And he presumed it could not be denied in that hall,
as a general principle, that it is an act of injustice, tyranny and oppres-
sion, to hold any part of the human race in bondage against their
consent.
53
The speeches, Appomattox angrily announced, had been published in
Richmond where they were likely to influence the blacks and to spread.
If insurrection by the blacks did break out, it would be due
not to the hallucinations or imposture of another Nat Turner, nor to
the seditious practices of negro preachers. . . nor to the dissemination
of the incendiary writings of The Liberator, or The African Sentinel, or
48. SYDNOR, supra note 39, at 227; FREEHLING, ROAD TO DISUNION, supra note 39, at 185.
49. Faulkner, supra note 41, at 15.
50. Chandler, supra note 42, at 8 (emphasis omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 8-9.
53. The Letter of Appomattox to the People of Virginia 18 (1832), in SLAVERY SOURCE MATE-
RIAL AND CRITICAL LITERATURE (Lousiville, Ky., Lost Cause Press) (Microfiche Reprint SLA
1084 (1971)) This letter is also published in the RICHMOND ENQUIRER, Feb. 4, 1832.
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The Genius of Universal Emancipation-but to measures proposed,
and to speeches delivered, in our own legislature, published and dis-
seminated by our own public journals.
54
Appomattox urged his readers to "pay no regard" to claims of indepen-
dence of the press. Slaveholders and their allies should take action to
silence opponents of slavery including a boycott of the abolition presses
that published these "inflammatory, dangerous, mischievous"" writings.
He urged private action instead of "sedition laws."
'56
Free speech on slavery can be seen from two perspectives. First it
may be viewed from the perspective of formal legal reactions to it: stat-
utes and jury and court decisions. Second it may be viewed from the
perspective of the broader social reaction to dissent. Obviously the two
systems influence each other. To the extent that Appomattox convinced
Virginians that criticism of slavery was illegitimate and tended to pro-
duce violence, the long run effect of his efforts would be to produce both
legal and extra-legal suppression. To the extent that the community sees
dissent on a subject as not only wrong, but illegitimate, free discussion of
that topic is likely to disappear.
Virginia proponents of emancipation refuted the claim that public
discussion of the issue was a grave wrong. They made a structural argu-
ment about the role of free speech in republican government, echoing
arguments that stretched back through Virginia's resolution rejecting the
Sedition Act to the Radical Whig heritage. Secrecy on the issue was
"unsuited to the genius of this government, which is based on the right of
the people, to a free and full examination of whatever concerns their in-
terest and happiness. ' 57 The Richmond Constitutional Whig suggested
that those who sought to silence debate on the question were reviving the
principles of the Sedition Act.58 One of the delegates to the Virginia
Assembly insisted that there was no resemblance "between the free and
manly discussion of a subject, by freemen, the representatives of freemen
... and the under-handed attempts of incendiary cut-throats [like Garri-
son or Lloyd], to sharpen the dagger in the hand of the midnight
assassin."'59 Feeling could no longer be repressed; lips of critics would
not remain sealed. "[The] golden rule and slavery are hard to
reconcile.'6°
54. Id. at 21.
55. Id. at 29-30.
56. Id. at 30.
57. Faulkner, supra note 41, at 2.
58. EATON, supra note 16, at 171.
59. Boiling, supra note 42, at 8.
60. Id. at 14.
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In the end, the debate had been free and opponents of slavery had
had their say. But they lost on the substantive issue: a resolution sup-
porting legislative action for the abolition of slavery failed by a vote of 73
to 58.61 Some supporters of emancipation were defeated at the next
election.
III. THE CRISIS OVER THE IMPENDING CRISIS
A. Sectionalism and Slavery: 1830-60
In the 1830s slavery became an increasingly divisive political issue.
In the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 Congress prohibited slavery in every
part of the West then under congressional jurisdiction.62 After that,
Congress, faced with increasing Southern demands, compromised the
policy of exclusion of slavery from the territories. The Louisiana terri-
tory was acquired without an antislavery restriction. In 1820 Missouri
was admitted as a slave state, but slavery was prohibited in the remainder
of the Louisiana Purchase lying north of latitude 36 degrees, 30 minutes.
Although the Kansas and Nebraska territories were included in the Mis-
souri compromise as areas where slavery was forbidden, in 1854 Con-
gress abrogated the compromise, bowing to further Southern demands.
The Kansas-Nebraska Act provided for the admission of Kansas and Ne-
braska with or without slavery as their constitutions might provide.
The Kansas-Nebraska Act struck the political world like a giant as-
teroid and so changed the environment that some older forms of political
life gradually became extinct. The Whig party disintegrated. Thirty-
seven of the forty-four Northern Democratic House members who voted
for the Kansas-Nebraska Act were defeated in the next election.63 The
Republican party, founded in 1854 largely on hostility to the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, made a strong run for the presidency in 1856. 64 In 1857,
in Dred Scott v. Sanford, the Court ruled that Americans had a federal
constitutional right to hold slaves in all territories, a right whose exercise
Congress lacked the power to prevent. 65 Since the keystone of the Re-
publican platform was exclusion of slavery from the territories, Dred
61. SYDNOR, supra note 39, at 228. For a discussion of Maryland and Delaware emancipation
debates, see FREEHLING, ROAD TO DISUNION, supra note 39, at 202-10.
62. Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama were not yet under federal control. A
proposal to apply the ban on slavery to all new American territory, north as well as south, had been
defeated in 1784. FREEHLING, ROAD TO DISUNION, supra note 39, at 138.
63. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE 188 (1978).
64. Id. at 188, 192.
65. 60 U.S. 393, 425-26 (1857).
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Scott implied that the Republican party platform was itself an unconsti-
tutional proposal.
After Dred Scott, Republicans feared a slave power conspiracy to
nationalize slavery, planting it not only in all the territories but in the
free states as well.66 And slavery, as many Republicans saw it, inevitably
required the suppression of liberty. As Senator Charles Sumner put it in
1860, denial of rights to the slave "can be sustained only by disregard of
other rights, common to the whole community, whether of person, of the
press, or of speech .... [S]ince slavery is endangered by liberty in any
form, therefore all liberty must be restrained. ' 67 Tobias Plants, a con-
servative Republican congressman, would make essentially the same
point in 1866.68 It was part of the common faith of the Republican
party. The progression seemed clear and grim. From enslaving blacks to
limiting the free speech rights of Southerners and Northerners in the
South; from censorship in the South to censorship in slave territories and
demands for censorship in the North; from demands for Northern cen-
sorship to the clubbing of Senator Sumner in the Senate; from slavery in
the Southern states with a ban on slavery in national territory to a consti-
tutional requirement that slavery be tolerated in all national territory and
next, Republicans feared, in Northern states also.
69
The Kansas territory showed just what the rules against antislavery
expression meant in practice. Slave owners and opponents of slavery
poured into Kansas and the territory literally became a battleground in
the sectional conflict. The proslavery government of the territory en-
acted a slave code. It made expressing antislavery opinions a crime; pro-
vided the death penalty for helping slaves escape; and required voters to
take an oath to support these laws.
70
One critic of the Kansas laws was John A. Bingham, an antislavery
congressman from Ohio and the future author of most of the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was proposed in 1866. 71 Bing-
ham's 1856 speech in the House of Representatives bristles with antipa-
thy to the Kansas statute:
Congress is to abide by this statute, which makes it a felony for a citi-
zen to utter or publish in that Territory "any sentiment calculated to
66. PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM AND COMITY 313-24
(1981).
67. GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 2595-97.
68. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1013 (1866) [hereinafter GLOBE 39(1)].
69. LINCOLN'S SPEECHES 1859-1865, supra note 9, at 53, 57-58; JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BAT-
TLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 178-88 (1988).
70. MCPHERSON, supra note 69, at 147.
71. The citizenship clause was added in the Senate and was not written by Bingham.
19931
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induce slaves to escape from the service of their masters." Hence it
would be a felony there to utter the strong words of Algernon Sidney,
"resistance to tyrants is obedience to God";... a felony to read in the
hearing of one of those fettered bondsmen the words of the Declara-
tion, "All men are born free and equal, and endowed by their Creator
with the inalienable rights of life and liberty"; .... Before you hold
this enactment to be law, burn our immortal Declaration and our free-
written Constitution, fetter our free press, and finally penetrate the
human soul and put out the light of understanding which the breath of
the Almighty hath kindled.
72
As in earlier and later cases of suppression of political speech, laws
against antislavery speech and press were often explicitly framed or justi-
fied in terms of the bad tendencies the speech was thought to have.
73
Bingham's invocation of the Declaration showed the havoc that a theory
justifying suppression of political speech because of "bad tendencies"
could play with the protection of political speech. But Bingham underes-
timated the potential reach of laws suppressing antislavery expression be-
cause of its perceived bad tendencies. By 1860 the North Carolina
Supreme Court would hold that the incendiary statements need not ini-
tially be heard by or directed to slaves or blacks to justify conviction of
those circulating them. Suppression of distribution to whites was re-
quired because of the danger the statements would eventually reach
blacks.
74
The Kansas statute was much like those enacted in Southern states.
Since Kansas was a federal territory, Bingham insisted, the limitations of
the First Amendment clearly applied to it. Under the decision in Barron
v. City of Baltimore,75 the guarantees of the Bill of Rights did not prevent
the states from enacting such statutes. There was significant dissent from
Barron, however.76 Indeed a significant minority of state supreme courts
held that the rights in the Bill of Rights limited state legislation, Barron
to the contrary notwithstanding.
77
B. The Struggle Over Free Speech in the States
1. Abolition and Reaction
Having taken a broad look at sectional conflict and slavery, it is
72. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 124 (1856).
73. E.g., N.C. REV. CODE ch. 34, § 16 (1855) (referring to circulation of matter "the evident
tendency whereof is to cause slaves to become discontented .
74. State v. Worth, 52 N.C. (1 Jones) 488, 492 (1860).
75. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833).
76. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 16, at 22-56; Amar, supra note 16, at
1205-16, 1223-38.
77. Nunn v. Georgia, 1 Ga. 243 (1846); Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394, 401-02 (1859); Rinehart
v. Schuyler, 7 Ill. (2 Gilm.) 473, 522 (1846). Most state courts followed Barron.
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worthwhile to drop back and look particularly at the free speech compo-
nent of the controversy in the states. By the 1830s abolition had merged
with a religious revival. To many abolitionists slaveholding was a sin and
slaveholders were sinners. The tone of much abolitionist rhetoric was
"fierce, bitter, and abusive. '78 In that, it was at least matched by South-
ern antiabolition rhetoric. In 1835 the American Anti-Slavery Society
produced a great stream of antislavery pamphlets and newspapers.
Many of these were given away and mailed to Southern states. 79 Some in
the Southern political elite reacted. South Carolinians seized from the
mails and publicly burned sacks of antislavery publications in Charles-
ton, South Carolina.
The controversy over antislavery publications provoked a battle in
Congress over abolition publications and the mails.80 In response to in-
creased antislavery agitation, Southern legislatures passed resolutions de-
manding that Northern states suppress abolition publications and the
Governor of Alabama demanded extradition of a New York abolition-
ist.81 The argument raised in the Virginia emancipation debates-that
criticism of slavery was an incendiary abuse of free speech-was begin-
ning to win out in much of the South. 2
Governor William Marcy of New York advocated legislative action
to punish persons who engaged in acts calculated and intended to pro-
duce rebellion in other states. The New York legislature did not pass
such a law. It responded that mobs made legislative action unneces-
sary.83 While the response of most Northern legislatures to Southern
demands for suppression and extradition was equivocal, the legislature of
Vermont defended free expression. It announced that "neither Congress
nor State Governments have any constitutional right to abridge free ex-
pression of opinions, or the transmission of them through the public
mail."8 4
Faced with an attack on their right to freedom of expression, aboli-
tionists responded with an invocation of the right to free discussion. In
response to suggestions that political speech with bad tendencies should
be suppressed, they invoked a core area of liberty beyond governmental
power. In their invocation of the rights to free speech and press and their
warnings about the dangers of censorship to political liberty, radical abo-
78. SYDNOR, supra note 39, at 238-42.
79. Id. at 232.
80. WIECEK, supra note 16, at 174-77.
81. Id. at 179-80; SAVAGE, supra note 16, at 37-38, 43-60.
82. EATON, supra note 16, at 162-237, 335-74.
83. WIECEK, supra note 16, at 179.
84. Id. at 181-82.
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litionists anticipated the Republican reaction to the events of 1859. In
February of 1836, Alvan Stewart of New York-antislavery legal
thinker, lawyer for the slave, and leader of the New York antislavery
society-responded to Governor Marcy's call for suppression of anti-
slavery expression. He ridiculed the idea of an abolition monster so pow-
erful that its extermination required "loss of liberty of the press, of con-
science, discussion, and of the inviolability of the mail."8 5 Marcy had
argued that because the power to suppress abolition publications was not
delegated to the federal government, it was retained by the states.
"There is a class of rights," Stewart responded, "of the most personal
and sacred character to the citizen, which are a portion of individual
sovereignty, never surrendered by the citizen ... either to the State or
General Government, and the Constitutions of the State and Union have
told the world, after enumerating them, that there is a class of unsur-
rendered rights .... ,,86 The legislatures of the states and of the Union,
Stewart insisted, "are forbidden by the constitutions of the States and
Union from touching those unsurrendered rights .... -87 This was so
"no matter in what distress or exigency a State may find itself .... ,,1s To
support his conclusion, Stewart cited the New York Constitution.
Stewart also made a shrewd analysis of the centrality of guarantees
of free expression to republican government. If those in power could use
the criminal justice system to silence their political critics, then the peo-
ple would be deprived of democratic choice. Although he did not cite
the Sedition Act, Stewart feared a replay of what it had attempted.
Oh, what scenes of abuse would have been played off before this world,
if licensed presses, gagged discussion, and mail inquisitors had been
tolerated! And we should have seen such laws passed in this State by a
party who had the ascendancy, if the constitution had not forbidden it,
by which one half of the community could neither speak, write, nor
publish anything of their adversaries, under pain of indictments, fine
and imprisonment.89
The citizens of New York, Stewart concluded, had the right to discuss,
print, and circulate "their sentiments on any moral problem, or any ques-
tion of right and wrong, of liberty and slavery." 90
Stewart relied primarily on his state constitution as a protection
against state action suppressing antislavery expression. He identified an
85. ALVAN STEWART, WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALVAN STEWART ON SLAVERY 59 (Lu-
ther R. Marsh ed., 1860).
86. Id. at 65.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 66.
90. Id. at 84.
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area of discussion that he suggested was simply beyond legislative power,
however compelling the reasons for action the legislature might assert.
While Stewart related free speech to natural rights, as the slavery contro-
versy intensified, Southerners began to repudiate the natural rights phi-
losophy. While Stewart relied on the right of the individual to discuss
political and moral questions, by 1859 Southerners in Congress relied
instead on the right of the community to suppress dangerous doctrine.
By 1860 the rejection of individual rights arguments and invocation of
the rights of the community were well developed by Southern
congressmen. 91
2. Before 1859: State Statutes and Prosecutions in Virginia and
North Carolina before the John Brown Raid
a. Statutes
The reason given for suppression of antislavery and abolitionist
speech in the South was that it had a dangerous tendency to cause vio-
lence. The essence of the abolitionist position was that slavery was a
crime: the crime of kidnapping. All people were created equal, so keep-
ing victims of kidnapping and their children as slaves were gross affronts
to civil liberties. Some opponents of slavery invoked the Declaration of
Independence and cited statements by people of the revolutionary gener-
ation to show that many recognized the inconsistency between the Decla-
ration and slavery. But the Declaration, of course, indicated that violent
resistance to tyranny was justified. The theory of the Declaration and
the fact of the Nat Turner rebellion produced a decided intellectual ten-
sion. By 1859 many Southern leaders in Congress resolved the tension
by rejecting the philosophy of the Declaration.92 They certainly rejected
a broad right to speak and write against the institution of slavery.
Statutes in Virginia and North Carolina reflected a reaction against
antislavery expression. North Carolina led the way with an 1830 act sup-
pressing expression with a tendency to cause slaves to rebel.93 On March
23, 1836, Virginia passed a comprehensive act aimed at antislavery agita-
tion.94 It was a response, the Virginia legislature noted, to attempts by
antislavery societies and "evil disposed persons ... to interfere with the
91. E.g., GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 1618 (Sen. Chestnut); id. at 436 (Rep. Smith) (repudiat-
ing many statements by men of the revolutionary generation as "false in philosophy and unsound in
fact."). See also id. at 1049 (Sen. Collamer) (quoting Sen. Calhoun).
92. E.g., GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 436.
93. An Act to Prevent the Circulation of Seditious Publications, ch. 5, 1830 N.C. Sess. Laws 10
(codified at N.C. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 17 (1837)).
94. An Act to Suppress the Circulation of Incendiary Publications, ch. 66, 1836 Va. Acts 44-
45.
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relations existing between master and slave in this state" and to incite a
spirit of insurrection and insubordination in blacks.9" The legislature
noted the flood of "incendiary books, pamphlets, or other writings of an
inflammatory and mischievous... tendency."'96 The antislavery societies
were not sending their tracts to slaves, but the Virginia legislature was in
no mood for fine distinctions.
The law provided for a fine and mandatory imprisonment of "any
member of an abolition or antislavery society ... who shall come into
this state, and shall here maintain, by speaking or writing, that the own-
ers of slaves have no property in the same, or advocate or advise the
abolition of slavery . . . . 97 That part of the statute targeted outsiders.
Another section of the act made it criminal for any person to produce or
circulate any book or writing "with the intent of advising, enticing, or
persuading persons of colour within this commonwealth... to rebel, or
denying the right of masters to property in their slaves, and inculcating
the duty of resistance to such right." 98 Slaves violating this section were
to be whipped, sold, and transported out of the country. Whites were to
be imprisoned not less than two years. A third section of the act required
postmasters to notify justices of the peace if incendiary documents ap-
peared in the mail. The justice was to burn the document and, if the
recipient had willingly received the book or pamphlet knowing its ten-
dency, he too was to be punished. Finally, the act provided for punish-
ment of postmasters who failed to comply with the act.99 Under this
statute the New York Tribune, a leading Republican paper, was banned
by a Virginia postmaster in 1859.100
Some provisions of the Virginia act clearly reached political speech
that did not directly incite criminal conduct. Under the Virginia act,
publication of some speeches emancipationists had made in the Virginia
legislature could be criminal. Virginia had taken a long step toward cen-
sorship of political speech. In 1832 "Appomattox" branded emancipa-
tionist sentiments incendiary and called for private action to suppress
them. Significantly he refused to call for a sedition law, a law making
criticism of government and existing institutions a crime. But by 1836
Virginia had passed one.'01
95. Id. at 44 (Preamble).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 1.
98. Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
99. Id. § 3.
100. EATON, supra note 16, at 211-12.
101. 1836 Va. Acts 44, § 3.
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b. Judicial Response
Still, the Virginia Court construed the statute of 1836 narrowly. It
did not, however, conclude that the Virginia Constitution simply prohib-
ited such legislation. In 1839, in Commonwealth v. Barrett,10 2 Barrett
was prosecuted for circulating an antislavery petition to Congress. Bar-
rett's petition denounced slavery in the District of Columbia as a sin
against God and a foul stain on the national character. 0 3 The Court
concluded that Barrett could not be convicted under the first section of
the act without proof that he was a member of an abolition society. Fur-
thermore, the prosecution under the third section of the act was a felony
and could not proceed by information. The legislature later plugged the
loophole in the act.1°4
In 1849 Jarvis Bacon, a minister, was indicted and convicted for
words in a sermon: "If I was to go to my neighbor's crib and steal his
corn, you would call me a thief, but [it is] worse to take a human being
and keep him all his life, and give him nothing for his labour, except once
in a while a whipping .. " .. 105 Listeners, not surprisingly, understood
him to refer to slavery. The defense attorneys suggested that the Virginia
statute of 1836 reached only the denial of legal right to property in
slaves, not moral right.' 0 6 Nor could the legislature make denial of
moral right to property in slaves a crime. To do so would violate the
Virginia constitution's free speech and freedom of religion guarantees
which [declare] that they shall pass no "law abridging freedom of
speech .... Nor shall any man be enforced, restrained, molested or
burthened in his body or goods, or otherwise suffer on account of his
religious opinions or belief, but all men shall be free to profess, and by
argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion."' 10
7
Justice Lomax, writing for the Court, held that statutes tending to re-
strain freedom of speech or freedom of religion "or supposed to have that
tendency," should be strictly construed. 0 8 The court found the defend-
ant's words ambiguous. After all, if one kept a slave and gave him no
comforts and nourishment but only whipped him, even supporters of
slavery might find this act worse than stealing corn. The defendant's
102. 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 665 (1839).
103. The right to petition Congress might well have been held protected under the federal Con-
stitution even though the guarantees of the First Amendment apparently did not limit states. Com-
pare Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833) with United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 552-53 (1875) (dicta).
104. 1848 Va. Acts ch. 10, § 25.
105. Bacon v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 602, 602-03 (1850).
106. Id. at 604-06.




statements might have referred only to spiritual concerns, not to legal
title. To find the defendant guilty, "[w]e must make him say, that to take
and keep a human being (or say slave) is worse than stealing corn, such
taking and keeping being equally without right of property in the slave-
owner, as in the thief who has stolen the corn."1°9 While the court de-
cided for the defendant, it did not announce a broad constitutional
protection for free speech.
Defendants in North Carolina did not fare so well. Jesse McBride
was an antislavery preacher from the Wesleyan Church. He came to
North Carolina from Ohio and, with a fellow Wesleyan minister who had
preceded him, preached to congregations in Guilford and surrounding
counties. McBride gave a young white girl a pamphlet on the Ten Com-
mandments; it suggested that slaveholders lived in violation of the Com-
mandments. He was charged with violation of an 1830 North Carolina
statute that made it a crime knowingly to circulate or publish any pam-
phlet with a "tendency" to cause insurrection or resistance in slaves. 110
The Declaration of Rights of the North Carolina Constitution contained
no explicit free speech provision, but it provided "[t]hat the freedom of
the Press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and therefore, ought
never to be restrained" and that "all men have a natural and unalienable
right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
consciences.""' At trial, these provisions did not protect McBride.
The press account does not discuss McBride's legal arguments suffi-
ciently to know how guarantees of free press and religious liberty were
applied or even if the issues were raised."12 Perhaps the freedom of the
press provision might have been read, in the Blackstonian tradition, as
limited to prior censorship rather than prohibiting subsequent punish-
ment. Perhaps freedom of the press was more broadly understood, but
simply was not thought to include attacks on the institution of slavery.
At any rate, McBride was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for
one year, to stand in the pillory for one hour, and to twenty lashes. He
was released as part of an agreement that he leave the state. Though his
colleague continued preaching for a time, as public pressure mounted he
109. Id. at 612.
110. Crooks and McBride, RALEIGH REG., Oct. 23, 1850, at 3. See also N.C. REV. STAT. ch. 34,
§ 17 (1837).
111. Declaration of Rights, N.C. CONST. §§ 15, 19, quoted in 1836 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES
OF THE CONVENTION OF NORTH-CAROLINA CALLED TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE 410.
112. See supra note 110.
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also fled, leaving his flock without a minister."t 3
2. An Intellectual Quarantine
By the mid-1830s much of the South was quarantining antislavery
expression. 114 This left abolitionists in a curious position. The slaves
and slave owners were in the South. Abolitionists had hoped to persuade
slave owners to abandon slavery. Increasingly they found themselves un-
able directly to address them. That left them to persuade the often hos-
tile masses of the North who, however, had no slaves. According to
Charles Sydnor, in the mid-1830s Whig Congressmen began pressing the
slavery issue by presenting antislavery petitions in an effort to split the
Northern and Southern wings of the Democratic party. Congress, over
Whig protests, passed the "gag rule," laying all abolitionist petitions on
the table without discussion or printing. Because political leaders used
congressional publication and dissemination of events in Congress as a
major source of public information, the gag rule closed one important
channel of communication. As slavery became increasingly politicized,
antislavery congressmen emerged in Congress." 5
The congressional gag rule, the 1837 murder of an Illinois abolition-
ist editor by a mob seeking to destroy his press, the suppression of free
speech in the South, and the congressional battle over antislavery and the
mails all enhanced the prestige of abolitionists who began to appear as
champions of civil liberty." 6 Although early on Garrison had rejected
political action and labeled voting a sin, starting in 1837 an increasing
faction of abolitionists favored political action and by 1840 even created
an antislavery political party.' '
7
The intellectual quarantine in North Carolina became ever more
strict. One case shows how times were changing. In 1856, Benjamin
Hedrick, a talented professor of Chemistry at the University of North
Carolina, was driven first from his job and then from the state for sup-
porting John C. Fremont, the Republican presidential candidate. Laws
against antislavery expression were merely the tip of an iceberg, and con-
formity was, in Hedrick's case, enforced by public opinion expressed
through mob action. Hedrick was "exposed" in the Raleigh Weekly
Standard. At the end of the affair, the Standard exalted:
113. Crooks and McBride, supra note 110, at 3. For a fine account, see Johnson, supra note 16,
at 299-301.
114. EATON, supra note 16, at 88, 335-52.
115. SYDNOR, supra note 39, at 232-42.
116. Cf. id. at 233-45.
117. SEWELL, supra note 16, at 43-72.
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We may have aided to magnify him somewhat in the public eye, but
that was one of the unavoidable incidents, and not the object. Our
object was to rid the University and the State of an avowed Fremont
man; and we succeeded. And we now say, after due consideration...
that no man who is avowedly for John C. Fremont for President ought
to be allowed to breathe the air or to tread the soil of North
Carolina. 118
Hedrick became a close friend of another exile from North Carolina,
Hinton Rowan Helper, the author of The Impending Crisis.
C. Abolitionist Constitutional Doctrine
As abolitionism developed and as states like North Carolina and
Virginia quarantined themselves to protect against the contagion of abo-
lition, abolitionist legal theory also began to change. The changes are
significant for our story because parts of radical abolitionist legal theory
were embraced by mainstream Republicans.
In spite of a lack of enthusiasm by some Southern courts for enforc-
ing laws against antislavery expression," 19 the prospect of broad protec-
tion of free speech for abolitionists under Southern laws and court
decisions looked bleak. One group of radical political abolitionists began
to appeal to the federal Constitution for protection of civil liberties
against state action.' 20 For Garrisonians, however, there was little aboli-
tionist legal theory in any event. They agreed with extreme Southerners
that the Constitution was a proslavery document, and Garrison de-
nounced it as a "covenant with death" and an "agreement with hell.' 2'
Garrison's ally, Wendell Phillips, insisted on judging the Constitution
based on original intent. Phillips insisted that it did not sanction interfer-
ence with slavery in the states, a view shared by most opponents of slav-
ery before the Civil War. But Phillips went further. He insisted that
even free blacks were viewed as inferior beings at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution, and it did not "concede them any of its privi-
leges."' 122 But the Radical political abolitionists had a very different
118. Mr. Hedrick Once More, RALEIGH WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 5, 1856, at 1. For other
articles in the same paper, see Professor Hedrick's Defence, RALEIGH WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 8,
1856, at 4; Prof Hedrick, of the University, RALEIGH WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 8, 1856, at 1. See
also JOHN S. BASSETT, ANTI-SLAVERY LEADERS OF NORTH CAROLINA 29-47 (reprint 1973)
(1898).
119. Eg., Bacon v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 602 (1850). For other prosecutions see
State v. Read, 6 La. Ann. 227 (1851); State v. McDonald, 4 Port. 449 (Ala. 1837).
120. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 16, at 42-44.
121. PHILLIP S. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND
EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 3 (1975).
122. WIECEK, supra note 16, at 239. W. PHILLIPS, THE CONSTITUTION, A PRO-SLAVERY COM-
PACT 96-97 (photo. reprint 1969) (1844).
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view. For them the Constitution protected civil liberties against both
state and federal action.
Joel Tiffany, author of an 1849 Treatise on the Unconstitutionality of
American Slavery, 123 was a lawyer and reporter for the New York
Supreme Court who grew up in a hot bed of antislavery sentiment in
Ohio. Tiffany believed that the guarantees of liberty in the original Con-
stitution and in the Bill of Rights limited the states and protected all
citizens of the United States from state action infringing their rights. In
this his views, though unorthodox, were not unique.1 24 Citizens were
entitled to "all the privileges and immunities ... guaranteed in the Fed-
eral Constitution"1 25 which included all its "guarantys ... for personal
security [and] . . . liberty."1 26 These were protected from hostile state
legislation. Some of the privileges guaranteed were listed by Tiffany: for
example, the right to petition, to habeas corpus, to keep and bear arms,
and against unwarrantable searches and seizures. 127
As between citizen and citizen, Tiffany thought protection of rights
was left largely to the states. Although the Bill of Rights limited the
states, where states fulfilled their duty of protection of citizens' rights, the
Bill of Rights typically did not provide a remedy for one citizen wronged
by another private citizen. As a result, Tiffany insisted that his theory
charted a middle course between states' rights and consolidation. 12s
Then, in a dramatic leap of faith, Tiffany concluded that slaves, like all
persons born or naturalized in the United States, were citizens. 129
Although few antislavery politicians agreed that slaves were citizens, Tif-
fany's other constitutional doctrines became increasingly influential.
Congressman John Bingham of Ohio was one person influenced by a
view of civil liberty like that espoused by Tiffany.
In 1866 Congressman Bingham wrote most of section one of the
Fourteenth Amendment including the provisions that
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
123. JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY
(photo reprint 1969) (1849).
124. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 16, at 24-25, 46-56; Amar, supra note 16,
at 1205-14.
125. TIFFANY, supra note 123, at 97.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 56-57, 84-89, 99.
128. Id. at 57-58.
129. Id. at 93-94.
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of the laws. 130
Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan presented the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Senate on behalf of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction.
Howard said that the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to require states to respect the liberties guar-
anteed in the Bill of Rights.' 3 ' John Bingham made similar
statements. 132
Even before the Civil War, however, Bingham read Article IV, Sec-
tion 2 as directing states to respect all constitutional guarantees of lib-
erty. One orthodox reading of Article IV limited it to protecting
temporary out-of-state visitors from discrimination in certain basic
rights. Article IV provides: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several states.
1 33
Bingham read it as containing an ellipsis, as implicitly containing the
material added in brackets: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens [of the United States] in the
several States."' 3 4 He read "privileges" as dictionaries of that time and
today do: as meaning rights.'35 Included were those rights in the Bill of
Rights. In using the word "privileges" in this way, Bingham was using it
exactly as members of the Revolutionary generation often had used it
and as James Madison used the word in the debate on the Bill of
Rights.1 36 Bingham believed that states were morally obligated to obey
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights by the oath state officers took to
support the Constitution. Still, he believed the Article IV, Section 2 obli-
gation was not legally enforceable. Although this reading seems strange
to us today, it was a federalism-based reading of Article IV that fit well
with interpretations the Court had put on other provisions of the Arti-
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
131. GLOBE 39(1), supra note 68, at 2765-66 (Sen. Howard).
132. Id. at 2542 (Rep. Bingham); see also CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871)
[hereinafter GLOBE 42(1) app.].
133. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
134. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess. 984 (1859).
135. For Bingham's views in 1859 see id. at 983-84; CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra
note 16, at 60-63. "Privilege... 1. a right, immunity or benefit enjoyed by a particular person or a
restricted group of persons... 5. any of the rights common to all citizens under a modem constitu-
tional government." RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1074 (1991). An 1851
law dictionary included among other definitions, "a right peculiar to some individual or body." 2 A
NEW LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 828 (1851). In Dred Scott, as Professor Crosskey noted,
the Chief Justice said that all rights and privileges under the Constitution belonged only to American
citizens. Blacks could not be citizens and so had no rights under the Constitution. 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393, 404, 449; Crosskey, supra note 16, at 5.
136. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 16, at 64-65, 67, 75-76 (Blackstone
describing English liberties as "privileges" and "immunities"). For the mixed heritage of the words,
see id. at 67-68. For Madison's use of the word privilege to describe Bill of Rights liberties, see supra
text accompanying notes 19 and 23.
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cle. 137 This interpretation preserved an appeal to the moral authority of
the Bill of Rights, and that moral authority was one way Madison hoped
the Bill would function to protect liberty.1 38 But if moral suasion failed,
judicial protection was not available.
The range of constitutional thinking before the Civil War was quite
broad. Some followed the orthodoxy of Barron v. Baltimore which held
that the Bill of Rights did not limit the states. Some, like Bingham, be-
lieved that in some sense states were obligated to obey the guarantees of
the Bill of Rights. Some, including many Southern and Northern Demo-
crats, believed that slaves were property and that the Due Process Clause
guaranteed the right to take them into federal territories and that anti-
slavery legislation was unconstitutional. In 1856 and 1860 the Republi-
can platform said that slaves were persons and the Due Process Clause
banned slavery in federal territories, though not in the states.1
39
A similarly broad range of ideas existed on the subject of slavery and
free speech. For some, the issue was simply up to the states. For others,
state statutes banning free speech and press on the subject of slavery vio-
lated constitutional obligations. Although much attention was devoted
to the subject in Congress in 1859 and 1860, there was little discussion of
the speaker's underlying legal theory. Still, the debate that swirled
around the topic on the eve of the Civil War gives us some guidance as to
different theories people held at that time about the First Amendment,
free speech, and free press. It also sheds light on whether the speaker
thought local option on the issue of free speech was acceptable. The cen-
terpiece of the debate on free speech in Congress in 1859-60 was Hinton
Rowan Helper's, Impending Crisis of the South: How to Meet It.
D. The Impending Crisis and the Free Speech Issue in Congress
1. Helper and his Book
Hinton Rowan Helper was born to a farm-owning family in Davie
County, North Carolina, in 1829. Except for a foray into California and
South America in an unsuccessful attempt to make his fortune, Helper
lived in North Carolina until publication of the Impending Crisis in
1857.140
The book was an appeal for antislavery political action by non-slave
137. See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (7
Pet.) 539 (1842). Curtis, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 16, at 63-64.
138. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 17, at 1030.
139. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 16, at 27-28, 46-47.
140. BASSETT, supra note 118, at 11-12.
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owners of the South. Helper supported forming an antislavery party, re-
fusing to vote for slaveholders, socially ostracizing slaveholders, boycott-
ing proslavery newspapers, and boycotting slave labor. 14' Helper's plan
involved no compensation for slave owners; instead they would be taxed
to pay the costs of colonizing their former slaves. Helper sought to
prove, with assistance from census data, that the South had become an
economic disaster area because of slavery. He saw slavery as especially
inimical to the interests of nonslaveholding whites. Much of the book
consisted of charts, tables, and statistics from the census to demonstrate
Southern backwardness, statements from men of the Revolutionary gen-
eration to show the evils of slavery, and excerpts from the Virginia aboli-
tion debates of 1832.142
Helper was a self-described abolitionist (free soilers, he said, were
just abolitionists in the tadpole stage), 43 and he faced the same dilemma
other abolitionists faced. He sought to speak emancipation to the South
and the South refused to listen. Abolition expression was silenced by
laws and mobs.
The most sympathetic interpretation of the violence suggested by
some of Helper's rhetoric is that it was contingent and designed to
demonstrate Helper's willingness to meet violence with violence to pro-
tect access to the channels of political expression for supporters of eman-
cipation. He repeatedly noted that free speech was denied to opponents
of slavery in the South, and he protested mobbings and tar-and-feather-
ings. "Free speech," Helper wrote, "is considered as treason against
slavery: and when people dare neither speak nor print their thoughts, free
thought itself is well nigh extinguished."'" "Give us fair-play," he de-
manded, "secure to us the right of discussion, the freedom of speech, and
we will settle the difficulty at the ballot box, not on the battleground-by
force of reason, not force of arms."' 145 Critics of the book did not usually
cite such statements. Instead, like the Richmond Whig, they quoted
other parts of the book, including the following passage:
So it seems that the total number of actual slave owners, including
their entire crew of cringing lickspittles, against whom we have to con-
tend, is but three hundred and forty-seven thousand five hundred and
twenty-five. Against this army for the defense and propagation of slav-
ery, we think it will be an easy matter-independent of the negroes,
141. HELPER, supra note 1, at 155-56; BASSErT, supra note 118, at 23-24.
142. E.g., HELPER, supra note 1, at 35-39, 62-66, 175-79.
143. Id. at 116. Unlike most Northern abolitionists, Helper advocated colonization of the
South's black population.
144. Id. at 409.
145. Id. at 149; BAssErr, supra note 118, at 23.
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who, in nine cases out of ten, would be delighted with an opportunity
to cut their masters' throats.. .- to muster one at least three times as
large, and far more respectable for its utter extinction. . . . We are
determined to abolish slavery at all hazards-in defiance of all opposi-
tion, of whatever nature, which it is possible for the slavocrats to bring
against us. 46
These sentiments were followed by a plea for a peaceful and political
resolution of differences, 147 but the Whig did not reprint those
statements.
The sentiments quoted in the Whig would have enraged Southern
supporters of slavery in the calmest of times. In fact, however, most of
the controversy about the Impending Crisis occurred during a period of
great alarm and excitement in the South-after John Brown's raid at
Harper's Ferry, a raid that was designed to free slaves by force of arms.
Helper's book was first published in 1857, on the heels of Fr6mont's
defeat. It was praised by many Northern opponents of slavery and en-
joyed significant but limited success. Opponents of slavery and Republi-
can politicians hit upon the idea of publishing an abridgment, a
"compendium" of the work and circulating it as a campaign docu-
ment.148 This project was advertised and well underway before Brown's
October 1859 raid. Over sixty Republican members of Congress had en-
dorsed the project.
149
2. The Context for Congressional Discussion in 1859-60: John
Brown's Raid at Harper's Ferry; Congress and Free Speech
On October 18, 1859, the New York Herald reported, "NEGRO IN-
SURRECTION AT HARPER'S FERRY. STRANGE AND EXCIT-
ING INTELLIGENCE . . . . [R]egular negro conspiracy."'' I S The
Herald's editor saw the event as a potent means of discrediting the Re-
publican party. This, the Democratic spin doctors of the day announced,
was the natural consequence of Republican doctrine. On the next day,
together with more news of Harper's Ferry, the Herald reprinted a
speech by Senator Seward of New York, a leading contender for the Re-
publican nomination.' 5 ' Seward had suggested an "irrepressible con-
146. HELPER, supra note 1, at 149, quoted in A False and Genuine Helper, RICHMOND WHIG,
Jan. 8, 1860, at 4.
147. HELPER, supra note 1, at 151.
148. DAVID M. PO-rrER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS 1848-1861, at 387 (1976).
149. Revolutionary Designs of the Abolitionists-New York Names Endorsing Treason, N.Y.
HERALD, Nov. 26, 1859, at 4.
150. N.Y. HERALD, Oct. 18, 1859, at 1.
151. The "Irrepressible Conflict, " Win. Seward's Brutal and Bloody Manifesto, N.Y. HERALD,
Oct. 19, 1859, at 2.
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flict' ' 152 between slavery and freedom. "No reasoning mind," the Herald
announced, "can fail to trace cause and effect between the bloody and
brutal manifesto of William H. Seward . . . and the terrible scenes of
violence [at Harper's Ferry]." 1 53 Later the Herald printed a list of Re-
publican endorsers of Helper's book and what it claimed were inflam-
matory passages from the book. "TEXT BOOK OF REVOLUTION,"
screamed the headline, "Republican Congressmen Franking Revolution-
ary Appeals." 1 54 Here was another "Black Republican" blueprint for
Harper's Ferry. In December 1859 a grand jury in Wilson County,
North Carolina, added a literal indictment to the political ones: it
branded the Impending Crisis treasonous to North Carolina and had
called on New York Republican Governor Edwin Morgan to deliver "to
indictment and punishment" Republican endorsers of the book, includ-
ing himself.' 55 Of course, no trial followed the indictment because the
defendants were beyond the power of the court.
3. The Democratic Attack
When Congress convened in December 1859, the Democrats at-
tempted again and again to nail John Brown's raid to the Republican
party. Democrats, particularly Southern Congressmen, cast themselves
in the role of prosecutor and judge. They cast Republicans as criminal
defendants-accessories before the fact to the Harper's Ferry raid.
Helper's book tended to cause violence; the violence of John Brown's
raid followed publication of the Helper book; Republicans had endorsed
the book; therefore the Republicans had endorsed violence. At a mini-
mum, violence was the natural consequence of their doctrines. 56 To
support this charge Democrats offered the expert opinion of a veteran
abolitionist agitator. John Brown's raid, they quoted Wendell Phillips as
saying, was "the natural result of antislavery teaching. For one, I accept
it; I expected it. "157 Although the debate on The Impending Crisis began
in the House, it soon spilled over into the Senate.
152. Speech by Gov. Seward, (Oct. 25, 1858) in COLLECTION OF ANTI-SLAVERY PROPAGANDA
IN THE OBERLIN COLLEGE LIBRARY (Lousiville, Ky., Lost Cause Press) (Microfiche Reprint SLB
1255 (1964)).
153. "Irrepressible Conflict, " supra note 151, at 2.
154. The Text Book of Revolution, N.Y. HERALD, Nov. 28, 1859, at 1.
155. N.Y. WKLY. TRIBUNE, Dec. 24, 31, 1859 cited in Earl S. Miers, Introduction to HINTON
ROWAN HELPER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE SOUTH 13 (Collier Books 1963) (1857).
156. E.g., GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 17 (Rep. Clark); id. at 21 (Rep. Millison); id. at 24 (Rep.
Keitt); id. at 28 (Sen. Mallory); id. at 29-30 (Sen. Iverson); id. at 45 (Rep. Lamar); id. at 49 (Rep.
Pryor); id. at 61-62 (Rep. Davis); id. at 95-96 (Rep. Curry); id. at 110-11 (Rep. Stewart); id. at 121
(Sen. Clay); id. at 281-82 (Rep. Pryor).
157. Id. at 94 (Rep. Curry); id. at 121 (Sen. Clay).
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John Sherman, Republican candidate for Speaker of the House of
Representatives, like nearly half the Republican Congressional delega-
tion, had endorsed publication of an abridged version of Helper's book.
A resolution proposed by Democratic representative John Clark of Mis-
souri announced that no endorser of Helper's book was fit to be
speaker. 158 After forty-four ballots Republicans fell just short of electing
John Sherman speaker. Finally Sherman withdrew in favor of a compro-
mise candidate.
Between ballots Democrats in the House (and also in the Senate)
discussed slavery, Senator William Seward, and most of all The Impend-
ing Crisis. Democrats, by placing the worst possible construction on
Helper's (or Seward's) words, sought to reap the benefits of putting the
worst possible construction on the actions of their political opponents.
Fire was the dominant metaphor. Senator Alfred Iverson of Georgia an-
nounced that Helper's book "inculcates incendiary sentiments."' 59
Republicans, said Representative Roger Pryor of Virginia, had applied
"the spark, and then affect astonishment at the explosion."' 6 Congress-
man Clark emphasized Helper's announcement that nonslaveholders
should act peaceably if they could, forcibly if they must, to strike against
slavery. "Do these [Republican] gentlemen expect that they can dis-
tribute incendiary books, give incendiary advice, advise rebellion ... T'
"Such advice," he thundered, "is treason[,] ... rebellion .... 161 Those
knowingly giving it deserved a fate it would not be respectful to
announce. ' 62
Concern for such civilities did not last long. Helper's book, said
Senator Iverson, returning to the attack, advised "our slaves to fire our
dwellings and put their knives to our throats."' 163 We "ought to hang
every man who has approved or indorsed it."164 Senator Seward shared
the billing with Helper as an incendiary. Senator Jefferson Davis of Mis-
sissippi, after noting the law of accessories before the fact, cited Seward's
irrepressible conflict speech: "That Senator made his speech before the
event; he may not have contemplated the fruit it bore--if, indeed, it bore
158. Id. at 3; Ollinger Crenshaw, The Speakership Contest of 1859-60, 29 Miss. VALLEY HIST.
REV. 323, 323-24 (1942).
159. GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 14.
160. Id. at 281.
161. Id. at 17.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 30.
164. Id. See also id. at 43 (Rep. Garnett); id. at 62-63 (Rep. Davis); id. at 71 (Rep. Moore); id. at




this." 1 65 But, Davis said, when Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois de-
fended the speech after the Harper's Ferry raid (arguing that it was being
misconstrued), he was "far more guilty" than Seward. 166 Representative
Reuben Davis, also from Mississippi, later suggested that Seward "de-
serves, I think the gallows .... ,"167 John Brown, announced representa-
tive Thomas Hindman of Arkansas, "was the tool of Republicanism,
doing its work; and now, that the work is done, Republican politicians
cannot skulk the responsibility." The country would "gibbet them for it"
and the hemp that strangled Brown would strangle the instigators.' 6
So it went, week after week, as Republicans repeatedly fell a few
votes short of the majority required to make Sherman the Speaker. Con-
gressmen came to the floor armed and some Southerners contemplated
coups and blood baths and wondered about the best way to launch seces-
sion.' 69 Slave state Democrats announced that the election of a "Black
Republican President" would be good cause for secession. One suggested
that the Union could be preserved only if the essentially criminal Repub-
lican party disbanded. 70
4. The Republican Response
Most Republicans in the House concluded that discussion of sub-
stantive issues was improper before the election of a Speaker. 17 So they
sat in silence. Sherman announced that he had no recollection of endors-
ing Helper's book and in any case had not read it. He had relied on the
suggestion of a friend. He disavowed any action by the North to inter-
fere with the domestic institutions of the South. A letter from one of the
sponsors of the compendium project indicated that the compendium was
supposed to delete offensive passages. 17 2 Republicans worried that the
Democratic effort to link them to Harper's Ferry might work, and a few
rushed to dissociate themselves from Helper's book.
A few conservative Republicans were the first to respond to the
Democratic indictment. Several recanted their endorsements, pleading
ignorance, and repudiated the book. 73 Representative Lucius Q.C. La-
165. Id. at 62.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 69.
168. Id. at 524.
169. Crenshaw, supra note 158, at 332-37.
170. GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 819 (Rep. Anderson, Mo.); see also id. at 841 (collection by
Rep. Clark).
171. Id. at 346 (Rep. Wells).
172. Eg., id. at 21 (Rep. Sherman); id. at 74 (Rep. Stanton); Crenshaw, supra note 158, at 325.
173. GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 4 (Rep. Kilgore); id. at 40 (Rep. Kellogg); id. at 394 (Rep.
Morris).
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mar of Mississippi suggested that the effort at repair came "too late for
the victims of the Harper's Ferry tragedy."' 174 Republicans were guilty
of the blood spilled on that occasion. Several House Republicans said
that the Democrats had grossly misrepresented Helper's book and, after
the eight week speakership deadlock was broken, more did so. 1 75
The early Republican reticence is curious. They were a few votes
short of what they needed, and perhaps conciliation by conservative
members and silence by the rest was intended to be reassuring. At any
rate, the lack of a vigorous defense disgusted the New York Tribune and
some party activists. 176 William Herndon, Abraham Lincoln's law part-
ner, suggested that Republicans in Congress were "grinding off the flesh
from their knee caps . . . . 177 Eventually, after a speaker was finally
selected, Republicans spoke powerfully and explicitly to the issues of the
day. Then Republican after Republican roundly condemned the South
for its repression of free speech. All in all the session was remarkable for
its lengthy discussions of slavery, the territories, natural rights, the views
of the founding generation, the Declaration of Independence, secession,
and free speech. The debate on free speech was one of the centerpieces of
the session.
5. The Debate on Free Speech: Politics and Theory
The 1859 congressional debate was conducted by politicians, not ju-
rists, legal theorists, or political philosophers. As a result, theories, to
the extent they were present, were often implicit rather than explicit.
Some Democrats suggested that Helper's book and Seward's irrepressible
conflict speech 178 had incited the Harper's Ferry raid, and that the incit-
ers were as guilty as the perpetrators. Still they did not frame their anal-
ysis in terms of the limits on free speech. Nonetheless they necessarily,
though implicitly, embraced the theory that political speech with bad
tendencies could be suppressed. 179 When they supported silencing aboli-
tionists in Southern states, they were, at least, making implicit statements
about the reach of guarantees for free expression under both state and
federal constitutions.
The Democrats focused the debate on Helper and Seward, as exam-
174. Id. at 45.
175. E.g., id. at 826 (Rep. Fenton); id. at 930-31 (Rep. Edgerton); id. at 1887-88 (Rep. Alley).
176. Id. at 40 (Rep. Kellogg) (quoting from N.Y. WKLY. TRIBUNE, Dec. 6, 1859).
177. SEWELL, supra note 16, at 357.
178. Seward, supra note 152.
179. The Southern "bad tendency" approach was later followed in Massachusetts and in the
United States Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Karvonen, 106 N.E. 556, 557 (Mass. 1914); Debs
v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
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pies of the evil tendency of Republican doctrine-a doctrine said to be
capable of producing horrible acts of violence. There were curious as-
pects to the attack. The official justification for suppression of antislav-
ery speech in the South was that it had the tendency to cause violence
and insurrections by the slaves. The slaveholder was particularly vulner-
able, Jefferson Davis noted, because "[t]he negroes, as domestics, have
access at all hours through the unlocked doors of their master's houses
... 9 '180 Still, for important and "proper" political purposes,
Southerners and Democrats were republishing the very statements
thought to be too dangerous to tolerate. Democratic and Southern news-
papers were spreading excerpts from Helper's "incendiary" book
throughout the North and South, as they had done with Seward's
speech.18 1 Indeed when Republicans complained that their doctrines
were not permitted to circulate in the South, Southern members of Con-
gress pointed to Southern papers that had reprinted Seward's "irrepressi-
ble conflict" speech.
Senator Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio, a strong foe of slavery, thought
he saw a curious paradox. If incendiary matter was dangerous, asked
Wade, was not the "most dangerous" of all that "which went to teach
the people [of the South] that a great party, controlling all the free States,
were sympathizing with raids upon the South; were ready to lend them-
selves to any uprising that might be got up there."'' 82 Still this "most
dangerous of all" incendiary speech was carried into Southern states by
the Democratic version of Republican ideas, without Republican anti-
dote or explanation. This was so because Republican papers were not
permitted to circulate there.
18 3
A final irony was that the attack on Helper's book transformed it
from a moderate success to a raging best seller. One hundred and forty-
two thousand copies of the book had been distributed by the fall of
1860.184 In December 1860, the New York Tribune, which was promot-
ing the book, cheerfully reported that Southern "Fire-eaters" and North-
ern "Doughfaces" had by their persistent discussion of The Impending
Crisis generated a circulation rapidly approaching that of Uncle Tom's
180. GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 63.
181. E.g., Revolutionary Designs of the Abolitionists, N.Y. HERALD, Nov. 26, 1859, at 4; The
Text Book of Revolution, supra note 154, at 1; Incitement to Treason and Civil War, RALEIGH
WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 7, 1859, at 1.
182. GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 141.
183. Id.; see also id. at 58 (Sen. Trumbull).
184. Joaquin J. Cardoso, Lincoln Abolitionism, and Patronage: The Case of Hinton Rowan
Helper, 53 J. NEGRO HIST. 144, 147 (1968).
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Cabin. 185
The opponents of slavery were quick to see a political agenda in the
paradoxical Democratic approach to the problem. Early in the session
Senator John P. Hale of New Hampshire suggested that Northern Dem-
ocrats, decimated by their support of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, were
weeping crocodile tears for the victims of the Harper's Ferry raid. Some
Northern Democrats, he said, "whom the tender solicitude of their con-
stituents had left in the retirement of private life, free from the corroding
cares of public station ... received the news of this outbreak in Virginia
with a perfect yell of delight."18 6 They hoped to use it as "something
they could catch hold of to ride into power." 18 7 Abraham Lincoln, in his
Cooper Institute Speech, suggested Democrats were trying to use "John
Brown, [the] Helper book, and the like [to] break up the Republican or-
ganization."1 88 Political implications were never far from the center of
the controversy. Southern nationalists used Helper, Seward, and
Harper's Ferry to show why secession was imperative if a "Black Repub-
lican" were elected President; Northern Democrats used the same events
as a stick with which to beat the "sectional" Republican party; and
Republicans used the secessionist speeches to discredit Northern
Democrats.
In the controversy over antislavery expression, Republicans thought
they heard the jingle of gold coins. John Bingham suggested that a pow-
erful slave owning plutocracy sought to protect slavery in order to pro-
tect its economic interests. "These gentlemen apprehend," said
Bingham, "that if free speech is tolerated and free labor protected by law,
free labor might attain... such dignity.., as would bring into disrepute
the system of slave labor, and bring about if you please, gradual emanci-
pation, thereby interfering with the profits of these gentlemen." 8 9 Abra-
ham Lincoln warned of the "proneness of prosperity to breed tyrants."190
Although one complaint about Helper's book was that it would lead
the slaves to violence, another concern was clearly present. Some Demo-
crats warned of means "other than those which John Brown resorted
to."' 19 Helper and Republicans, Democrats insisted, were trying to de-
185. Helper's Crisis, N.Y. TRIB., Dec. 27, 1859, at 4.
186. GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 7.
187. Id.
188. 3 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 541 (Roy Basler
ed., 1953).
189. GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 1861.
190. 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 406 (Roy Basler
ed., 1953).
191. GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 240-41 (Rep. Smith, Va.).
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velop a local opposition among the nonslaveholding white majority of the
South. Ultimately, Democratic Senator George Pugh of Ohio charged,
they hoped "to strike down slavery [in the South] by changing state con-
stitutions."' 92 Indeed, Republicans did hope to use nonslaveholders as a
great lever to achieve emancipation in the South. In particular, Republi-
cans planned to use patronage, free speech, and free access to the mails to
develop this local opposition after a Republican was elected President.
John Sherman wrote Lydia Child suggesting that within two years of the
election of a Republican President, there would be a Republican party in
every Southern state. A Republican victory, Sherman insisted, would
encourage emancipation by the Southern states themselves. In this sense
the Southern fear of an attack on slavery in the South was well founded.
Republican postmasters would not be likely to censor Republican or an-
tislavery literature. Democratic Senator William Gwin of California sug-
gested that Southern states would not tolerate Republican
postmasters. 93 (In those days, of course, postmasters were key political
operatives and organizers, not just deliverers of mail.)
Some Republican complaints about suppression of speech in the
South could be handled by constitutional doctrine that was consistent
with Barron. Some Southern laws and actions explicitly discriminated
against out-of-state "agitators" or publications. Those might be an-
swered by a conventional reading of Article IV, Section 2 that prohibited
discrimination against out-of-staters. Democrats had long pointed out,
however, that laws in the South typically did not discriminate against
those from other states. Antislavery expression was equally forbidden
for Southern opponents of slavery. 194 Sometimes Southerners suppressed
supporters of the national Republican party or its candidates. Such ac-
tions might be dealt with not by invoking a broad view of free speech, but
by insisting that the republican nature of the national government meant
that such behavior was unconstitutional. 195 Such limited responses
might have been the main ones made, but they were not.
Because Republicans thought free speech on the subject of slavery in
the South was essential to the development of a Republican party there,
Republicans did not embrace a view of free speech that limited it to "le-
192. Id. at 407.
193. FONER, supra note 8, at 122, 207; GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 240 (Rep. Smith, Va.); id.
at 282 (Rep. Pryor, Va.); id. at 462 (Rep. Underwood); id. at 95 (Rep. Curry); id. at 912 (Sen.
Seward) (asserting that freedom of speech and ballot would produce a large Republican party in the
South); id. at 125 (Rep. Gwin); id. at 407 (Sen. Pugh).
194. CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 9 (1835) (report of Postmaster General
Kendall).
195. Eg., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875); BLACK, supra note 29, at 33-50.
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gitimate" subjects of national legislation. For slavery in the states, most
Republicans conceded, was not such a subject. 196 Because they insisted
on the right of people in the South to discuss slavery, they did not em-
brace the view that the privileges of American citizens were limited to
protection of national political speech or to protection of out-of-staters
against discrimination. So the Republican demand for free speech on
slavery was a seamless fabric, moving without any marked transition
from complaints about suppression of free speech on national topics and
complaints about suppression of speech of Northerners to complaints
about the suppression of antislavery expression by Southerners on both
state and national topics. Nor was freedom of expression aimed at slav-
ery limited to political speech, narrowly defined. It included antislavery
religious expression by ministers who discussed the theological aspects of
slavery and antislavery artistic expression, like the best seller Uncle
Tom's Cabin. Similarly, appeals to the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States which Republicans thought were protected by
Article IV often moved seemlessly from complaints about discrimination
against citizens from other states to complaints about violation of the
"absolute" rights of American citizens to free speech.197
6. The Republican Demands for Free Speech
From the beginning, Republicans had made demands for free speech
a centerpiece of their political program. Their campaign slogan in 1856
had been "Free Speech, Free Press, Free Men, Free Labor, Free Terri-
tory, and Fr6mont." 198 When Republicans embraced "free speech" in
the context of the struggle over slavery, that decision also implied ideas
about the role and limits of free speech. Implicitly, and sometimes ex-
plicitly, most who spoke to the issue repudiated the bad tendency test by
appealing instead to a core area of speech beyond government power to
suppress. 199
Early in the 1859 congressional session, Democratic Senator Albert
Brown of Mississippi pointed out that Republican Senator Henry Wilson
of Massachusetts had attended an antislavery meeting. The sponsors of
the meeting passed a resolution declaring the right and duty of slaves to
resist their masters and of Northerners to incite them to resistance.
196. GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 54 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 66 (Rep. Leach); LINCOLN'S
SPEECHES 1859-1865, supra note 9, at 61.
197. See infra notes 213, 221-25, 232-33, 248, 253-56.
198. SEWELL, supra note 16, at 284.
199. For a discussion of the two approaches to the free speech issue, see Hugo L. Black, The Bill
of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 867 (1960); Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the
Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1430-32 (1962).
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Brown asked if Wilson had spoken against the resolution. Wilson ex-
plained that he had spoken a few days before to a large meeting where he
had condemned John Brown's raid. He had been invited to the second
meeting to hear from the other side, and he had attended.
20°
Senator Brown's question to Senator Wilson opened a running dis-
cussion of free speech, North and South. The debate took place in the
context of a resolution passed by a meeting in Massachusetts that was a
clear call to resistance by slaves. It was the very sort of incitement the
Democrats were trying, with the use of less promising material, to pin on
the Republicans. "Senators should remember," Wilson said, "that the
right to hold meetings and to utter opinions upon all matters of public
concern is an acknowledged right in my section .... I wish the people of
other sections of the country would thus cherish the sacred right of free
discussion. ' 20 1 Senator Fessenden, later Chairman of the Joint Commit-
tee on Reconstruction in the 39th Congress (the committee that proposed
the Fourteenth Amendment), made much the same point. He refuted
the claim that the resolution urging resistance by slaves was proof that
public opinion in the North approved the Brown raid.20 2 "[W]e allow
everybody to hold a public meeting that wants one, and he may say what
he pleases .... We are not in the habit of interfering with the expression
of opinion by anybody; persons may say what they like."
'20 3
That freedom of speech was denied to opponents of slavery in the
South struck Republicans as an outrage against the principles of liberty.
Senator Trumbull discussed Republican support for a ban on slavery in
the territories, and compared it to the chameleon-like Democratic ap-
proach to the issue. "We do not preach popular sovereignty in the
North, and scout it as a humbug in the South, ' ' 2° Trumbull announced.
"You do not preach it in the South at all," interjected Senator Pugh,
Democrat of Ohio.20 5 Trumbull retorted that "the men who do not al-
low our principles to be proclaimed in the South talk about sectionalism.
A sectionalism, so pure ... that it will not tolerate the exposition of the
principles of its opponents at all where it is in power, talks to the other
party about sectionalism!"206
In the Lincoln-Douglas debates, Lincoln made a similar point.
Douglas argued that the Republicans were a sectional party because they
200. GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 12.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 31.
203. Id.
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could not proclaim their doctrines in the South. Lincoln responded that
the exclusion of Republicans from the South was the result of despotism.
Douglas also could not go to Czarist Russia to proclaim democracy and
denounce monarchy.20 7 Senator Wilson protested that there was not a
Republican Senator who could send his frank into Southern states with-
out subjecting "his letter to be opened, examined, and destroyed.
'208
Southern papers and some Southern legislatures had offered rewards, he
noted, for the heads of opponents of slavery, including some Republican
members of Congress.
2°9
Senator Wilson engaged in a lengthy dialogue with Southern Sena-
tors on free speech in the slave states. He was not discussing, Wilson
insisted, inciting slaves to rebel. Southerners held such men "amenable
to their laws."' 210 But, said Wilson, "throughout a large portion of the
South," men who entertain opinions on slavery like those of Washington,
Jefferson, and Patrick Henry, "cannot reside, . . . cannot exist, in
safety. '211 Senator Brown of Georgia said that Wilson could go into his
state and avow "any sentiments which he has a right to entertain. ' 21 2 He
would not, however, be permitted to urge Brown's slaves to cut Brown's
throat. Wilson insisted that was not the issue. He noted that Professor
Hedrick had been driven from North Carolina because he supported
Fremont and that John Underwood was compelled to leave Virginia be-
cause he attended the Republican national convention of 1856.213 Sena-
tor Brown replied that support for Fr6mont was, indeed, a far different
matter:
[T]here was a great deal more involved in the .. .election of Mr.
Fremont ... beyond the mere avowal of that sentiment [that Kansas
should be a free state] .... I would not myself tolerate any man who
would go to my State and avow his preference for the election of Mr.
Seward upon the program he laid down in his Rochester speech
214
Seward would not be permitted to teach his irrepressible conflict doctrine
"because our safety, . . . our peace, the peace of our hearths, depends
upon the repression of such doctrines with us."'21 5
207. CREATED EQUAL? THE COMPLETE LINCOLN DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 290-91, 300
(Paul Angle ed., 1958).
208. GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 128.
209. Id.







Wilson said that Brown had conceded his point. "Mr. Stanard was
driven from Norfolk for simply attempting to vote for Fr6mont .... In
the [South], where we have an inbred constitutional right to advocate
these doctrines, it is confessed that we will not be permitted to do it.
' 216
"Every American citizen," Wilson insisted, had a right "to advocate ex-
clusion of slavery from the Territories .... Slavery will not tolerate free
speech and a free press."' 217 Wilson also defended Helper's book. It con-
tained "the most valuable information" together with a few phrases those
who had recommended it would disavow.218
Earlier in his remarks Wilson had made a ringing defense of free
speech: "[I]n Massachusetts we have absolute freedom of speech and of
the press. We deal with all public questions, all social questions, all ques-
tions that concern the human race. We have nothing there that prevents
the fullest and boldest discussion .... -219 The Senator from Georgia
could go there and advocate slavery, the dissolution of the Union, or re-
opening the slave trade and he would be "listened to in peace" and "re-
ceived kindly. '220 Wilson knew that this was hard for Senators to under-
stand who came from a section where "freedom of speech on some
political, moral, and social subjects is not tolerated ....
Most Republicans denied that Helper's book was incendiary. After
the controversy erupted over Helper's book, Senator Wade said he had
studied it in detail. By rhetorical questions he suggested that nothing in
the book was "dangerous to the people of any section .... -222 It con-
tained nothing that "could not safely be entrusted to the hands of any
freeman. ' 223 It was simply composed of arguments addressed by a non-
slaveholder to his fellow nonslaveholders. "Unless such arguments are
unlawful there, I see nothing in the book but what is just, right, and
proper for the consideration of all men who take an interest in these
matters. ' 224 Wade clearly thought the book should be protected
expression:
[H]as it come to this, in free America, that there must be a censorship
of the press instituted; that a man cannot give currency to a book con-
taining arguments that he thinks essentially affect the rights of whole
classes of the free population of this nation? I hope not, and I believe
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 65.
219. Id. at 63.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 64.
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not.22
5
Senator Seward also made a defense of the principle of free speech,
and he mixed references to why national action to suppress speech was
inappropriate with a more general statement of principle. Southerners
had complained he said, that Republicans
sanction too unreservedly books designed to advocate emancipation.
But surely you can hardly expect the Federal Government or the polit-
ical parties of the nation to maintain a censorship of the press or of
debate. The theory of our system is, that error of opinion may in all
cases safely be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.
226
According to Congressman Sidney Edgerton of Ohio, Republicans
were being denounced as traitors for adopting the antislavery opinions of
Jefferson, Washington, Madison, and Henry. There had been a complete
suppression of free speech in the South. "For years," he said,
in most of the slaveholding states, the most sacred provisions of the
Constitution have been wantonly and persistently violated. Where is
the liberty of speech and of the press in the slaveholding states? Can a
northern man... print and speak his opinions? Not if he believes in
the Declaration of Independence.
227
Nor could preachers "discuss the moral bearings of slavery .... 228
Threats against opponents of slavery and arrests for selling Helper's
book illustrated the denial of free speech and press. Southerners had said
Reverend Beecher would be hung if he came South. "And the gentleman
from South Carolina informed the House that ... they had arrested a
man for selling Helper's book" 229 and had said they would hang him.
Edgerton said he had studied Helper's book. It did not, as charged, ad-
vise "insurrection, treason, servile war, arson, and murder. '230 Those
who made such charges had "never read the book. And yet to sell this
harmless book in a slave State is considered a crime. Where is your con-
stitutional liberty?" 23' The "liberty of South Carolina" was equivalent to
the "despotism of Austria. '232 "Gentlemen of the South," Edgerton ex-
claimed, "the North demands of you the observance of constitutional
obligations. She demands that her citizens be protected by your laws in
the enjoyment of their constitutional rights. She demands the freedom of
speech and of the press; and if your peculiar institution cannot stand
225. Id.
226. Id. at 913.
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before them, let it go down .... ,233
Representative Henry Waldron of Michigan reached similar
conclusions:
This slave Democracy tramples [the Constitution] under foot. We
have sacred guarantees in that instrument in behalf of free speech, free
thought, and a free press, and yet today Democratic postmasters rifle
mails and violate the sanctity of private correspondence. Today a sys-
tem of espionage prevails which would disgrace the despotism and
darkness of the middle ages. The newspaper which refuses to recount
the blessings and sing the praises of slavery is committed to the flames.
The press that refuses to vilify the memory of the fathers is taken by a
ruthless mob and engulfed beneath the waters. The personal safety of
the traveler depends not on his deeds, but upon his opinions. And
these outrages are daily committed under the rule of the Democracy,
because that party has taken under its guardian care an institution
which can only exist and prosper at the sacrifice and expense of the
constitutional rights of the citizen. Where slavery is there can be no
free speech, no free thought, no free press, no regard for constitutions,
no deference to courts. 234
Other Republican members of Congress also complained that slav-
ery caused suppression of free speech and press-by actions of state, fed-
eral, or territorial governments, and by mob action. 235 They expressed
concern for free speech directed to state as well as national issues. John
Bingham said, "today, it would cost a man his life to rise deliberately in
the Legislature of Virginia and announce a sentiment in favor of emanci-
pation, such as [were] announced by some of her most distinguished sons
in the memorable debate of 1832."236
One Republican objection to permitting slavery in the territories was
that slavery inevitably would bring its despotic practices with it. Slave
owners would pass territorial laws that denied freedom of speech and of
the press. "They claim the right to seal every man's lips, and stop every
man's mouth, on questions of great national interest," complained Con-
gressman Cydnor Tompkins of Ohio.237 They would "condemn as a
felon the man who dares proclaim the precepts of our holy religion." 23
8
They would "strip naked and cut into gashes the back of the man who
233. Id. at 931.
234. Id. at 1872.
235. Id. at 1031-32 (Rep. Van Wyck); id. at 1039-40 (Rep. Perry) (appealing also to a somewhat
more conventional reading of the interstate privileges or immunities clause to bolster his complaint
of lack of protection for visitors from the North); id. at 1585 (Rep. Wells); id. at 1861-62 (Rep.
Bingham).
236. Id. at 1861.
237. Id. at 1857.
238. Id.
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utters opinions" that did not square with those of the slaveholders. 239
While Republicans protested the slave states' system of censorship
in the interests of slavery and warned that it would inevitably spread to
all slave territories, some Democrats advocated extending the suppres-
sion of antislavery sentiments to the free states. Representatives Daniel
Sickles of New York and Muscoe Garnett of Virginia suggested that
Governor Marcy of New York had been correct in 1836 when he advo-
cated legislation to suppress abolitionist expression.240 Sickles implied
that such expression should have been "put down" by law because it
"lead[s] to bad consequences."' 241 Now that the North was learning that
men in their states planned to carry "discord, invasion, and danger" to
the South, Sickles said, the North was going to recur to the "wise and
patriotic recommendation of Governor Marcy. ' 242 In February and
March of 1860 Abraham Lincoln warned that the "slave power," along
with other demands, insisted that "Senator Douglas's new sedition law
must be enacted and enforced, suppressing all declarations that slavery is
wrong, whether made in politics, in presses, in pulpits, or in private. '243
In June of 1860, after Lincoln's nomination, the Senate considered a
series of resolutions on slavery offered by Jefferson Davis, Senator from
Mississippi, former Secretary of War, and future President of the Con-
federate States of America. One resolution said that slavery, "as it exists
in fifteen states of this Union, composes an important portion of their
domestic institutions . -"244 Slavery, the resolution continued, was rec-
ognized by the Constitution as "constituting an important element in ap-
portionment of powers among the states. ' 245 Nothing could justify
"open or covert attacks [on slavery] with a view to its overthrow." 246
Such attacks, the resolution declared, were a "breach of faith" and a
violation of the national "compact.1 247 Senator James Harlan of Iowa
proposed a free speech amendment to the resolution:
But free discussion of the morality and expediency of slavery should
never be interfered with by the laws of any State, or of the United
States; and the freedom of speech and of the press, on this and every
other subject of domestic and national policy, should be maintained
239. Id. at 1857.
240. Id. at 133 (Rep. Sickles); id. at 44 (Rep. Garnett).
241. Id. at 133.
242. Id.
243. LINCOLN'S SPEECHES 1859-1865, supra note 9, at 128 (Address at Cooper Institute); id. at
149 (Address at New Haven).
244. GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 2321 (emphasis added).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 2321.
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inviolate in all the States. 248
The Senate defeated the amendment on a party line vote, but the
amendment received the support of every Republican in the Senate who
voted on the issue.249 The resolution is strong evidence that Republicans
were calling for free speech on all issues of policy-local as well as
national.
The word "domestic" in the resolution meant local to the states.
Slavery, according to Jefferson Davis' resolution, was an important part
of the "domestic" institutions of fifteen states. 250 Republicans sought to
amend the resolution by calling for free speech on all issues of policy,
"domestic" as well as national. The word "domestic" here takes its
meaning from the use of the same word earlier in the resolution to refer
to the "domestic" institutions of fifteen states. The meaning of the word
"domestic" in the free speech resolution is also illuminated by the larger
context in which it was used-the context of uproar over a book advocat-
ing political action in the Southern states themselves to end slavery.
Democrats in the Senate rejected the free speech amendment. The
party of James Madison rejected a demand for free speech on all political
issues, including slavery. The institution of slavery reshaped ideas of lib-
erty to suit its needs.
On April 5, 1860, Owen Lovejoy rose to make a bitter denunciation
of slavery. 25 1 Lovejoy was a Congressman from Illinois, a supporter of
Lincoln, an intense critic of slavery, an outspoken proponent of assisting
fugitive slaves escaping from bondage, and the brother of Elijah Lovejoy,
the antislavery newspaper editor who had been killed defending his press
from a proslavery mob. His speech, which denounced slaveholding as
"the sum of all villainy," 252 came close to causing a riot on the floor of
the House. On the issue of free speech, however, Lovejoy's position was
close to that of most Republicans who spoke on the issue. He supported,
he said, Helper's object: organizing a party in the Slave states against
slavery. Those objecting to the book were insisting that "an American
citizen, address[ing] himself to his fellow-citizens, in a peaceful way,
through the press . . .must be hanged .... "253 Like John Bingham,
Lovejoy invoked the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States as protecting basic rights, including free speech and press. "I do
248. Id. (emphasis added).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. GLOBE 36(1) app., supra note 7, at 202.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 205.
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claim the right of discussing this question of slavery anywhere, on any
square foot of American soil over which the stars and stripes float, to
which the privileges and immunities of the Constitution extend.1
254
"[T]hat Constitution, which guaranties to me free speech .... ",255 pro-
tected his right to criticize slavery. Just as the invocation of Roman citi-
zenship protected ancient Romans, so American citizenship should
protect Americans in their rights. "That is my response to the question
of why I recommended circulation of the Helper book." Lovejoy
claimed "the privilege of going anywhere . . . as a free citizen, un-
molested, and of uttering, in an orderly and legal way, any sentiment that
I choose to utter .... *"256 Among his other complaints Lovejoy pro-
tested that Southern states "imprison or exile preachers of the
Gospel.
'2 57
Lovejoy's speech ended on a somber note. Representative Elbert
Martin of Virginia announced, "[a]nd if you come among us we will do
with you as we did with John Brown-hang you up as high as Ha-
man. '258 "I have no doubt of it," replied Congressman Lovejoy. 259
E. The Impending Crisis in North Carolina: the Trial of Reverend
Daniel Worth
1. Daniel Worth, his Arrest, and the North Carolina Reaction
On the day that Congressman Lovejoy spoke, and complained about
Southern states that "imprison or exile preachers of the Gospel," 26° the
New York Times reported that Reverend Daniel Worth, Wesleyan Minis-
ter, was convicted in North Carolina of circulating Helper's book.261 He
was sentenced to a year in prison.262 Worth's arrests in two counties for
circulating the Helper book had been reported earlier in the antislavery
press. The National Era had reported it wearily on January 12, 1860.263
"We should literally have no room for anything else," the paper re-
ported, "if we were to publish all the details of whippings, tar-and-





258. Id. at 207.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 205.
261. Case of Rev. Daniel Worth, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 5, 1860, at 5; see also Case of Rev. Daniel
Worth, Apr. 6, 1860, at 6.
262. Case of Rev. Daniel Worth, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1860, at 6.
263. Freedom of Speech in the South, NAT'L ERA, Jan. 12, 1860, at 6.
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the South.'264 It expected that Worth would be convicted and suffer
"fine, imprisonment, and whipping. ' 265
Worth had been born in 1795 in Guilford County, North Carolina
to a devout Quaker family. He and his family migrated to Indiana in
1822, as many antislavery Quakers had done. Worth was active in the
Indiana antislavery society in the 1840s and later supported the Republi-
can party.
In 1857 Daniel Worth, by this time a Wesleyan Minister, left his
clerical duties in Indiana for North Carolina. The American Missionary
Association (a strongly antislavery organization) supplied him with fi-
nancial support and fifty copies of Helper's book. Worth returned to
Guilford County, North Carolina, where he began to preach his anti-
slavery version of the Gospel. He sold all fifty copies of Helper's book
and ordered more, and he secured subscriptions for the New York Trib-
une, the same antislavery newspaper that was seized from the mail and
burned in Virginia in 1859.266
Worth was aware that his work was dangerous. "[I] can preach,"
he reported to his nephew with satisfaction, "and have done it, as strong
and direct against slavery as ever you heard me in the north, and I be-
lieve that there is not another man that could. ' 267 He attributed his suc-
cess to his age, Southern birth, and his influential family connections. 268
After the raid on Harper's Ferry, pressure to suppress Worth in-
creased. On November 26, 1859, the North Carolina Presbyterian
warned that "society must be protected against cut-throats and assas-
sins," and demanded that an unnamed abolitionist fanatic preacher be
removed from the state.2 69 The North Carolina Raleigh Weekly Stan-
dard asked for the name: was he the fanatic Daniel Worth, the minister
who had even been referred to in Helper's book as a Southern minister
preaching against slavery?270 On December 17, 1859, the North Carolina
Presbyterian obligingly supplied Worth's name. "[I]t is notorious," the
paper wrote, "that [Daniel Worth] has been inculcating, publicly and
privately, his incendiary doctrines in Randolph and Guilford counties,
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Tolbert, supra note 16, at 284-90. For a second powerfully researched article dealing with
Worth, see Johnson, supra note 16.
267. Letter from Daniel Worth to Aaron Worth (Apr. 30, 1858), in Tolbert, supra note 16, at
290.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 291.
270. An Abolition Emissary, RALEIGH WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 14, 1959, at 1, in Tolbert, supra
note 16, at 291.
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and the time has come when he should be compelled to abandon this
work. ' 271 On December 10, 1859, the Council of State passed a resolu-
tion saying postmasters who delivered incendiary books or newspapers to
the addressee should be prosecuted as circulators of the item. 272 Another
resolution enjoined all public officers to subject out of state merchants,
book dealers, tract distributors, and lecturers to "the strictest
scrutiny.
'273
On December 21, 1859, Worth wrote to the American Missionary
Association forecasting "times of trial. ' 274 "Since the unfortunate affair
at Harper's Ferry, the county is in a tremendous ferment. Threatenings
reach me from various quarters .... 1-275 The North Carolina papers
were filled with denunciations of Helper's book and the sixty-eight Re-
publican Congressmen who endorsed it. The Raleigh Register reprinted
excerpts from The Impending Crisis to show the enormity of the offense.
It quoted a passage in which Helper demanded
as the only true means of attaining to a position worthy of sovereign
States... an energetic, intelligent, enterprising, virtuous, and unshack-
led population, an untrammelled press, and the freedom of speech.
For ourselves, as white people, and for the negroes and other persons
of whatever color or condition, we demand all the rights, interests and
prerogatives that are guaranteed to corresponding classes of mankind
in the North .... 276
By Christmas Daniel Worth was under arrest.
Worth's arrest and preliminary hearing were reported widely in the
North Carolina press. Raleigh and Greensboro papers of all political
persuasions were unanimous in their condemnation of Worth. 277 In the
Greensboro Patriot's account of the preliminary hearing, the editor said
he had not read Helper's book, "but from extracts which were read on
the trial" it was "infamous" and should "consign to infamy" all who
circulated it.278 "[T]hey will most assuredly receive condign punish-
ment. ' 279 To the extent that Helper's book was a political issue, each
party used it in an attempt to tar the other. Democrats charged that
271. The Abolition Emissary, N.C. PRESBYTERIAN, Dec. 17, 1859, at 1.
272. The Council of State, RALEIGH WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 14, 1859, at 1.
273. Id.
274. Letter from Daniel Worth to American Missionary Association (Dec. 21, 1859), in John-
son, supra note 16, at 312.
275. Id.
276. Hinton R. Helper's Infamous Book-What the Sixty-Eight Demand, WKLY. RALEIGH
REG., Dec. 14, 1859, at 1.
277. Arrest of Rev. Daniel Worth, RALEIGH WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 28, 1859, at 3; Arrest of
Rev. Daniel Worth, WKLY. RALEIGH REG., Jan. 4, 1860, at 1; Arrest and Trial of Rev. Daniel Worth,
GREENSBORO PATRIOT, Jan. 6, 1860, at 3.




Whig Congressman John Gilmer had been mailed a copy by Helper. Gil-
mer denied knowing possession. Gilmer's supporters then claimed that
Governor Ellis had received a copy of the book. Ellis responded that he
had thrown the first copy he received out the window, and when a second
copy of the book was sent to him, he used its incendiary pages to light his
pipe.28
0
The Raleigh Standard noted efforts to circulate Helper's book and
called for increased vigilance. "We would," it sternly lectured, "again
remind Postmasters of their duties in this respect. Let every copy of
Helper's book, and every copy of the New York Tribune, and every docu-
ment franked by Seward, Wilson, Burlingame, John Sherman, and other
abolitionists which may come to their offices, be committed to the
flames.,,281
Politicians, judges, and ordinary citizens united in their effort to
suppress Worth and his associates. John T. Harriss, a farm laborer in
Randolph County wrote Governor Ellis "a flew lines concerning Daniel
Worth he has bin circulating a seditious Book.. . by the title of Helpers
impending Crisis one Jacob Briles, senr has one [as did Jacob junior] ...
and it can bea proven that they got them of this same Daniel Worth
... 282 The Governor promptly wrote an irate letter to Judge Dick, a
superior court judge. "The local magistrates. . . ," the Governor pro-
tested, "have been, up to this time wholly remiss in suppressing the most
flagrant violations of Law-the circulation of incendiary books & papers,
and the use of language calculated to incite slaves to insurrection
.... "283 Upon receiving Harriss' letter from the Governor, Judge Dick
wrote the Governor to say that he "forthwith issued a warrant for Jacob
Bryles [Briles] senr" instructing the sheriff "to search for books. ' 284 The
Judge assured the Governor that all that properly could be done was
being done, "and I fear that more will be done than ought to be done. ' 285
Had Worth been released on bail, the Judge said, he would have been
hung. No one, the Judge promised, would escape against whom evidence
could be obtained.286 Following this promise, the press reported the
arrest of a number of others suspected of involvement with the Helper
280. See, e.g., GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 188 (Rep. Gilmer); Helper's Book, GREENSBORO
PATRIOT, Aug. 12, 1859, at 2.
281. Incendiary Documents, RALEIGH WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 4, 1860, at 1.
282. John T. Harriss to John W. Ellis (Dec. 30, 1859), in I PAPERS OF JOHN W. ELLIS 340
(1964).
283. Id. at 342- 43.
284. Id. at 343-44.
285. Id. at 344.
286. Id. at 344-45.
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book.2 7
At least one North Carolinian did criticize the prosecutions, but he
wrote from the safety of his exile in New York City. Benjamin Hedrick,
the deposed and exiled chemistry professor, wrote to his old friend
Thomas Ruffin, formerly Chief Justice of North Carolina. He asked Ruf-
fin to use his influence to "arrest the terrorism and fanaticism which now
so much disturbs the South .... Some of the men recently arrested are
among the best men in the state .... " Their persecution could only be
arrested by intervention of upright citizens. Hedrick continued:
In order that you may have an opportunity to know also what offense
is laid to some of these men I send you a copy of Helper's book. You
will find not a word in it is addressed to either free or slave negroes,
That [sic] most of the sentiments that are current in the state and at-
tributed to this book, are the fabrications of the New York Herald.
Please examine the book and see if there is any thing in it that one free-
man may not properly address to any other. For myself I am free to
admit that I do not approve of every proposition advocated in the
book, nor with the manner in which some good propositions are main-
tained. But unless we tolerate difference of opinion we must have des-
potism at once.
28 8
Hedrick also sent Ruffin a copy of a searing indictment of slavery pub-
lished in Greensboro in 1830. It argued that slaves were entitled to state
constitutional protections of liberty and that they were the victims of
kidnapping. Hedrick also alluded to an 1832 speech by Judge William
Gaston of the North Carolina Supreme Court to show "[iut was not then
treason to discuss slavery, and to print opinions adverse to the sys-
tem."' 289 Hedrick later engaged counsel for Worth and raised money for
his defense. 29
°
Meanwhile, Judge Ruffin received correspondence about Worth
from Reverend George McNeil, the editor who had "exposed" Worth.
McNeil passed on a letter from Jonathan Worth, Daniel's influential
cousin.291 "In addition to the horror of having a minister of the Gospel,
aged 68 years [sic] whipped," Jonathan Worth warned, "[t]he abolition-
287. The Abolitionist George W. Vestal, DAILY PROGRESS, Jan. 3, 1860, at 2; The Abolitionists
Worth and Turner, DAILY PROGRESS, Jan. 3, 1860, at 2; Abolitionists Worth and Turner, RALEIGH
WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 4, 1860, at 1; Arrest of A Suspicious Character, WKLY. RALEIGH REG., Jan.
4, 1860, at 1.
288. From Benjamin S. Hedrick to Thomas Ruffin (Jan. 16, 1860), in 3 PAPERS OF THOMAS
RUFFIN 64 (J.G. de Roulhac Hamilton ed., 1920).
289. Id. at 65. For the antislavery pamphlet, see Address to the People of North Carolina on the
Evils of Slavery, MANUMISSION SOCIETY OF NORTH CAROLINA 5, 9, 13, 15 (reprint 1860) (1830).
290. Tolbert, supra note 16, at 298.
291. From George McNeill, Jr. to Thomas Ruffin (Mar. 12, 1860), in 1 PAPERS OF THOMAS
RUFFIN 73 (J.G. de Roulhac Hamilton ed., 1920).
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ists at home and abroad will turn it to account." 292 Jonathan Worth also
complained about the statute under which Worth had been convicted:
Judge Shepherd held at Montgomery last week, that an article in the
religious creed of a Society declaring that Slavery is inconsistent with
Christian religion, if printed and circulated among its members, would
make the person circulating it indictable under this Statute, because all
religious societies admit slaves as members and such an article would
have an "evident tendency to make them dissatisfied with their social
condition." This reasoning seems to be clear. It follows that all
Quakers are indictable under this Statute and liable to ignominious
punishment .... Its execution, according to this interpretation would
produce general horror.2
93
Jonathan Worth would have limited the statute to those intending to
"produce dissatisfaction among slaves" and said his cousin, except for his
age and otherwise "exemplary character," was a fit case for the execution
of the statute. All things considered, he hoped the whipping would be
omitted and Daniel Worth would be permitted to leave the state.
294
2. The Trials of Daniel Worth
Daniel Worth was charged with violating Section 16 of Chapter 34
of the North Carolina statutes, passed originally in the 1830s and revised
in 1854.295 Section 16 made it a crime to circulate "any written or
printed pamphlet or paper.., the evident tendency whereof is to cause
slaves to become discontented with the bondage in which they are held
... and free negroes to be dissatisfied with their social condition. ' 296 For
the first offense, persons violating the statute were to be whipped, put in
the pillory and imprisoned for not less than a year. 297 For the second
offense the punishment was death.
298
At his preliminary hearing, Worth admitted selling Helper's book,
but denied that his object was to stir up insurrection. His was a mission
of peace.299 Worth was bound over for trial in Superior Court. He re-
mained incarcerated pending trial. Meanwhile, an additional shipment
292. From Jonathan Worth to George McNeill Jr. (Mar. 10, 1860), in 1 PAPERS OF THOMAS
RUFFIN, supra note 291, at 74.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Act to Prevent Circulation of Seditious Publications, N.C. REV. CODE ch. 34, § 16 (1854)




299. Arrest and Trial of Rev. Daniel Worth, supra note 277, at 3. The following account of
Worth's trial comes from fragmentary press accounts and from the few surviving appellate papers.
These do not include the defendant's brief.
[Vol. 68:1113
CRISIS OVER HINTON HELPER'S BOOK
of Helper's book was seized and publicly burned.300
At Worth's first trial, in Randolph County, the prosecutor read the
jury the indictment containing lengthy extracts from The Impending Cri-
sis. The Guilford indictment (which is probably similar) quoted Helper's
argument that slavery was a nuisance and non slaveholders were con-
cerned with it just as they would be in the case of mad dogs; that slavery
was worse than stealing; and that slave and free negro victims of crimes
were not permitted to testify against white oppressors. The indictment
also quoted the passage in which Helper compared, in the event of vio-
lent confrontation, the number of slaveholders who would be arrayed
against nonslaveholders-independent of slaves who would often be "de-
lighted with an opportunity to cut their masters throats."'30 Unlike the
New York Herald, the indictment quoted the rest of the passage: a hope
and belief that the matter would be adjusted without violence; a desire
for peace, not war; and finally Helper's plea to give us "freedom of
speech, and we will settle this difficulty at the [ballot] box, not on the
battleground by force."' 302 Though the indictment went on for some
eighteen pages, the passages referred to are representative.
Jury selection was difficult because so many potential jurors were
already convinced of Worth's guilt.30 3 At trial the State proved that
Worth sold the book. Jacob Briles, uncovered as a result of the letter
from the farm laborer to Governor Ellis, became a witness for the state
and testified against Worth. Counsel stipulated that the book need not be
read. Worth offered no evidence. Unfortunately, the local newspaper
did not report the "able and sometimes truly eloquent" arguments on
both sides. 304 The court charged the jury that a book was within the
reach of the statute even though the statute specifically listed only papers
and pamphlets. Whether the book was incendiary was left to the jury to
determine. The jury retired at 11 p.m. and returned a guilty verdict at 4
a.m. the next morning. Judge Bailey sentenced Worth to a year in prison
and excused the whipping. 30 5
The Guilford trial was a repeat performance with the same lawyers
and judge, but this time the jury convicted in fifteen minutes.30 6 Worth
300. Johnson, supra note 16, at 315.
301. Indictment, State v. Worth, Guilford County, North Carolina Department of Archives and
History, 1-6 (1860).
302. Id. at 7-8.
303. See Johnson, supra note 16, at 317; Randolph Superior Court, GREENSBORO PATRIOT, Apr.
6, 1860, at 2.
304. Randolph Superior Court, GREENSBORO TIMES, Apr. 7, 1860, at 6.
305. Id.; Randolph Superior Court, GREENSBORO PATRIOT, Apr. 6, 1860, at 2.
306. Trial of Rev. Daniel Worth, GREENSBORO TIMEs, May 5, 1860, at 6.
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appealed, his bond was reduced, and he quietly slipped out of North Car-
olina. The authorities apparently wanted to avoid not only the provoca-
tive spectacle of an elderly minister of the gospel placed in the pillory and
whipped-an outcome the judge had apparently foreclosed-but it seems
they also wanted to avoid the spectacle of Worth's imprisonment. Worth
went on a speaking tour of the North to raise the funds necessary to
reimburse his bondsmen. If he could not raise the funds and if he lost his
appeal, he said he would return to be imprisoned.
In a speech in New York, Worth insisted that Helper's book was not
"addressed to the colored people, ' 30 7 and he had never given the book to
them. Worth said he had defended himself at the preliminary hearing,
making what "they said was a regular abolitionist harangue. '30 "I
quoted from Mr. Helper's book the language of Thomas Jefferson" to the
effect that in a contest between slave and master, God would be on the
side of the slave.3°9 Worth reported that his friend Hinton Helper had
contributed $50.00 to his bail fund. 310
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed Worth's conviction. 31l
It was not necessary to prove, the supreme court held, that the book was
delivered to slaves or free Negroes or was read in their presence. "The
circulation, within the State, is alike prohibited, whether it be amongst
whites or blacks," Justice Charles Manly wrote. 312 "The Legislature
seems to have assumed, that if a circulation, within the State, was once
established, that its corrupting influence would inevitably reach the
black. ' 313 Guilt turned on intent. A copy could be delivered by one
person to another without incurring guilt, when it was delivered to grat-
ify curiosity, "both parties to the act being equally opposed to the de-
sign."' 314 With this observation, perhaps Manly had solved the paradox
of why it was lawful for North Carolina papers to publish extracts from
Helper's book while at the same time circulation of the book by its pro-
ponents was criminal. Finally, Manly had no problem finding the work
inflammatory. Every passage of it, "in the most inflamatory [sic]
words," declared that "the slave ought to be discontented with his condi-
tion, and the master deposed from his, and that the change should be
307. Daniel Worth in New York, GREENSBORO TIMEs, May 19, 1860, at 2.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 2-3. A Christian Minister in The South: The Story ofRev. Daniel Worth, N.Y. TRIB.,
May 8, 1860, at 5. See also. Church Anti-Slavery Society, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1860, at 8.
311. State v. Worth, 52 N.C. 488 (1860).
312. Id. at 492.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 490.
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effected, even at the cost of blood. ' 315 Worth's counsel seems not explic-
itly to have raised nor did the court explicitly consider claims that the
statute violated free press or free speech. (The North Carolina Constitu-
tion had no explicit protection for free speech, but provided that "the
freedom of the Press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and therefore
ought never to be restrained.
' 31 6)
In 1860 the North Carolina Legislature amended the incendiary
document statute. Worth's crime, circulating an "incendiary" book on
the subject of slavery, was henceforth punishable by death for the first
offense.
317
IV. A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM
A. The Impending Crisis and Application of the Bill of Rights to the
States
James McPherson has suggested that the Civil War was a second
American Revolution. 318 Democrats repeatedly insisted that the Repub-
licans were a revolutionary party. Indeed one of the characteristics of
the Helper book that critics found outrageous was his suggestion that
slavery was the unfinished business of the first American revolution.
319
In 1860 Senator James Chestnut, Jr., of South Carolina said the Republi-
can party was governed by the Red Republican principles of France,
though it had "changed its complexion" and "blacked its face."' 320 The
fundamental fallacy of the Republican party was that it held "that the
Declaration of Independence is the basis of the Constitution .... ,,32,
When they considered the power and duties of the Government with ref-
erence to the domestic affairs of the states, Republicans, Chestnut said,
"string their sophistical arguments" on the "abstract opinions" of the
Declaration. ' 322 "This fatal error arises... out of the untenable postu-
late that all men, under all governments, are naturally and equally enti-
tled to liberty, without reference to the well-being of society or to their
315. Id. at 493.
316. Declaration of Rights, N.C. CONST. § 15, quoted in 1836 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF
THE CONVENTION OF NORTH-CAROLINA CALLED TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE
410.
317. 1860 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 23, at 39 (1860).
318. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION
23-42, 131-52 (1991). The extent to which the second American Revolution envisioned consolida-
tion of power in the federal government is subject to dispute and any theory of full consolidation is
hard to square with the evidence.
319. E.g., GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 1617 (Sen. Chestnut).
320. Id. at 1619.
321. Id. at 1617.
322. Id.
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own fitness to enjoy and preserve it. '"323
In response to charges like those of Chestnut, Republicans insisted
they were the true conservatives, conserving the heritage of liberty es-
poused by the Declaration of Independence and the leaders of the Ameri-
can Revolution. In 1860 Republicans repeatedly invoked the antislavery
expressions of the Revolutionary Fathers. They cited antislavery state-
ments of Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and George Washington,
and early antislavery resolutions from Georgia and other colonies.
324
And they cited Luther Martin, delegate to the Constitutional Convention
from Maryland, again and again: slavery was incompatible with republi-
canism and had the tendency to destroy those principles on which it was
supported.
325
Secession by the South was, as some historians have suggested, a
pre-emptive counter revolution. As Southerners saw it, Republicans
would not be content with banning slavery from the territories. Republi-
cans insisted, with Lincoln, that Americans should never forget that slav-
ery was wrong everywhere. They hoped that the election of a
Republican president and the use of patronage would establish an anti-
slavery party in the Southern states. That party would then abolish slav-
ery on a state by state basis. Senator Seward suggested that if free speech
were restored in the South, the Republicans promptly would have as
many supporters there as the Democrats did in the North.326 Democrats
insisted that election of a Republican president could never be accepted
by all the states. Southern states would never tolerate Republican office-
holders and postmasters who could not be expected to eliminate anti-
slavery publications from the mails. 32
7
Secession by the South did inaugurate the second American Revolu-
tion. Within five short years slavery had been abolished and Republicans
had proposed an amendment to make blacks citizens and to secure civil
liberty for all American citizens. The basis of their philosophy was, as
Senator Chestnut suggested, the idea of the Declaration of Independence
that government was established to secure individual rights. Republicans
were no longer willing to allow local denials of basic rights. The need to
protect citizens against state denials of their rights was reiterated time
and again by the Republicans in the Congresses that proposed the Thir-
323. Id. at 1618.
324. E.g., id. at 822-26 (Rep. Fenton).
325. Id. at 823.
326. LINCOLN'S SPEECHES 1859-1865, supra note 9, at 129-30; GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at
912-13 (Sen. Seward).
327. GLOBE 36(i), supra note 2, at 125 (Sen. Gwin); id. at 455 (Sen. Clingman).
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teenth and Fourteenth Amendments. They insisted on giving all citizens
the "shield" of "all the guarantees of the Constitution." 328 In the same
debates Republicans recurred again and again to denials of civil liberty
that had characterized the pre-Civil War years. The main exhibits in
their litany of horrors were state denials of freedom of speech, press, and
religion. The controversy surrounding the Helper book and the trial of
Daniel Worth help us understand, from a distance of many years, what
Republicans were talking about.
During debates on abolition, James Wilson, Chairman of the Judici-
ary Committee in the 38th and 39th Congresses, cited the privileges and
immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2 to illustrate slavery's denial of
constitutional rights. "Freedom of religious opinion, freedom of speech
and press, and the right of assemblage for the purpose of petition belong
to every American citizen, high or low, rich or poor, wherever he may be
within the jurisdiction of the United States. With these rights no State
may interfere .... ,,329 Still slavery had suppressed free exercise of reli-
gion for those who took the golden rule as a rule for conduct. It had
destroyed free speech and press. "The press has been padlocked, and
men's lips have been sealed."' 330 Many other Republicans also recalled
slavery's denials of free speech.
331
In 1866, as Republicans saw it, a new spirit of recalcitrance was
evident in the South. Andrew Johnson wanted immediate readmission of
the Southern States to Congress, but Congress balked. Southern states
passed Black Codes that discriminated against blacks in rights to own
property, to testify, and to contract and also denied them fundamental
rights referred to in the Bill of Rights. Congressmen complained that
constitutional rights of Unionists and blacks were once again being vio-
lated. Southerners once again suppressed free speech and other constitu-
328. GLOBE 39(1), supra note 68, at 728 (Rep. Welker); id. at 586 (Rep. Donnelly); id. at 632
(Rep. Kelley); id. at 1088 (Rep. Woodbridge) (on need to keep states within their orbits); id. at 1088
(Rep. Bingham); id. at 1183 (Rep. Pomeroy); id. at 1152 (Rep. Thayer); id. at 1263 (Rep. Broomall);
id. at 1629 (Rep. Hart); id. at 1832-33 (Rep. Lawrence); id. at 2542 (Rep. Bingham); id. at 1072
(Sen. Nye); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 67 (Garfield); id. at 256 (Rep. Baker);
CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 16, at 49-56, 59, 63-91.
329. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (Rep. Wilson) [hereinafter GLOBE 38(1)].
330. Id.
331. E.g., id. at 1313 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1439 (Sen. Harlan); id. at 2615 (Rep. Morris);
GLOBE 39(l), supra note 68, at 1013 (Rep. Clarke); id. at 1263 (Rep. Bromall); id. at 1072 (Sen.
Nye). Cf GLOBE 38(1), supra note 329, at 114 (Rep. Arnold); id. at 1202 (Rep. Wilson); id. at 1971-
72 (Rep. Scofield); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 138 (Rep. Ashley); id. at 193 (Rep. Kas-
son); GLOBE 39(1), supra note 68, at 157-58 (Rep. Bingham); id. at 1617 (Rep. Moulton); id. at 1627
(Rep. Buckland); id. at 1627-29 (Rep. Hart); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 255-56




In this situation Congressman John Bingham insisted that a consti-
tutional amendment was needed to give Congress the power to enforce
all the "guaranties of the Constitution. ' 333 In 1859 some Republican
members of Congress insisted that the protection of the citizen's liberty
depended on the action of his state and was beyond the power of the
federal government. By 1866, before ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, some leading Republicans were insisting that Congress
could correct state legislation violating citizens' rights through its power
to enforce the Bill of Rights. Bingham, to the contrary, insisted a consti-
tutional amendment was necessary for that purpose. In 1866 no Repub-
lican in Congress said it was desirable to allow a state the "right" to deny
individual rights.334 In 1866 Republicans explicitly provided that no
state shall "abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States." 335
The word "privileges" had long been used in Anglo-American legal
history to describe Bill of Rights type liberties.3 36 (It also had been used
in a different way in Article IV, according to one orthodox analysis.)
Madison himself had described the freedom of the press and the rights of
conscience as the "choicest privileges of the people" and again as "invalu-
able privileges. '337 So crucial were these privileges, indeed, that Madison
favored a double security for them. He advocated federal as well as state
constitutional guarantees against violating them. John Bingham repeat-
edly indicated that his purpose was to draft a constitutional amendment
to enforce all the "guarantees of the Constitution" and to require the
332. Petitions presented by lawmakers from citizens demanded protection for rights of speech,
press, assembly, and the right to bear arms. GLOBE 39(1), supra note 68, at 337 (Sen. Sumner); id. at
494 (Sen. Howard); see also id. at 462 (Rep. Baker) ("IT]he American citizen shall no more be
degraded... by being required to surrender his conscience as a peace-offering to... an ... aristoc-
racy of class"); id. at 1617 (Rep. Moulton) (complaining of outrages against Union men and freed-
men; "[t]here is neither freedom of speech, of the press, or protection to life, liberty, or property
...."); id. at 1629 (Rep. Hart) (insisting on the need to ensure that rebel states have a government
that respects guarantees in the Bill of Rights); id. at 1837 (Rep. Clarke) (need for "irreversible
guarantees" of civil liberty including for rights recognized and secured by the Constitution). For a
fuller review, see CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 16, at 34-91.
333. GLOBE 39(l), supra note 68, at 432.
334. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 16, at 34-130.
335. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
336. A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITU-
TIONALISM IN AMERICA 141-43, 174, 179-80, 182, 412-25 (1968); 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 129 (1825); CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE,
supra note 16, at 64-65.
337. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 17, at 1033 (Madison in the first Congress); CURTIS,
No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 16, at 64-65, 74-77; Curtis, A Reply to Professor Berger,
supra note 16, at 48.
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states to obey them. 338 The Fourteenth Amendment did not purport to
create new rights, but in the fashion of state and federal bills of rights, it
secured those rights assumed to belong to the citizen from invasion by
the states. The 1789 Congressional Resolution submitting the original
proposal for a Bill of Rights to the states, described the Bill of Rights not
as creating rights but as "further declaratory and restrictive clauses. '339
Justice Black championed John Bingham as the father of incorpora-
tion and described Bingham as the James Madison of the Fourteenth
Amendment.340  Some scholars have answered Black's comparison of
Bingham with Madison with ad hominem attacks on Bingham, with sug-
gestions that a plan to require states to obey the Bill of Rights heralded
the destruction of federalism, and with incredulity. 34' Still, Bingham did
follow Madison's plan for a double security for basic constitutional
rights, including those in the Bill of Rights. He used the word "privi-
leges" to describe constitutional rights, including those in the Bill of
Rights. That was one of the two words Madison used to describe such
rights in Congress in 1789. Like Madison, Bingham was concerned with
protecting minorities against the tyranny of the majority. Yet, he went
further than Madison and included other constitutional privileges as
well, like the protection against cruel and unusual punishment and
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Perhaps experience with
statutes that allowed whipping ministers who advocated an antislavery
gospel and experience with searches of the mail and of travelers for in-
cendiary documents led him to conclude that double security for these
privileges was also required. Perhaps in 1866, when Bingham said that
section one of the Fourteenth Amendment was needed to prevent states
from inflicting cruel or unusual punishments, 342 he thought of the whip
338. E.g., GLOBE 39(1), supra note 68, at 432.
339. Resolution of Congress March 4, 1789 transmitting proposed amendments to the states
describing them as "declaratory and restrictive clauses." THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 20 (published by the Commission on the Bi-
centennial of the United States Constitution, Washington, D.C. 1991). Cf Howard Jay Graham,
Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3, 37 (1954-55).
340. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
341. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 145-46 (1977); 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 462, 1289 (1971). For a very important
and thoughtful defense of Bingham from the ad hominem attacks of his critics, see Richard L.
Aynes, supra note 16. For a careful analysis of the post Civil War constitutional amendments in
light of the original Constitution and federalism, see Michael P. Zuckert, Completing the Constitu-
tion: The Fourteenth Amendment and Constitutional Rights, 22 PUBLIUS 69 (Spring, 1992); Michael
P. Zuckert, Completing the Constitution, The Thirteenth Amendment, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 259
(1987); see also, Michael P. Zuckert, Congressional Power Under the Fourteenth Amendment-The
Original Understanding of Section Five, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 123 (1986).
342. GLOBE 39(1), supra note 68, at 2542.
1993]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
and the pillory, the punishments provided for outspoken opponents of
slavery. There is much to be said for Justice Black's comparison of John
Bingham to James Madison.
If the Civil War was the second American Revolution, the Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments gave birth to a transformed Consti-
tution and Bill of Rights. The most revolutionary aspect of the change
was the attempted transformation of the African American population
from slavery (with badges of slavery for free blacks) to citizenship and
equal civil rights. In another sense the change was less revolutionary. It
was simply amending the Constitution to reflect the principles of the
Declaration.
Compared to the racial revolution, proposed changes in the means
of protecting basic liberties were far less revolutionary. The basic rights
of English people and the rights of freedom of speech, press, and religion
had been assumed to be the possession of all American citizens. These
rights had been "protected" by the Bill of Rights against the federal gov-
ernment and by and large by state guarantees against the states. The
Declaration of Independence indicated that government was organized
to protect basic rights. So the idea that states had a state's right to vio-
late such fundamental rights struck Republicans as absurd. The Four-
teenth Amendment added a new enforcement mechanism-a "double
security" to use Madison's phrase. The ship of liberty would henceforth
have life boats as well as a double hull.343 Perhaps that is why the
change was so noncontroversial and was assumed to have been effectu-
ated by so many leading Republicans at the time.344 It is much like the
system the Supreme Court, following a curious path, has finally arrived
at today. There were four constitutional law treatises written shortly af-
ter the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed. Three of these, as Rich-
ard Aynes has noted, said that the amendment was designed to require
states to obey Bill of Rights guarantees. 3
45
Shortly after Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to the
343. The metaphor comes from Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1, 23-34 (1988).
344. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 16, at 131-70; Michael Zuckert, The Poli-
tics of Judicial Interpretation: the Federal Courts, Department of Justice and Civil Rights 1866-1876;
No State Shall Abridge: the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY
149-63 (1991) (book review).
345. Judge Timothy Farrar, an abolitionist legal theorist, published his Manual of the Constitu-
tion of the United States ofAmerica in 1867. Like Bingham, Farrar argued that Article IV, Section 2
enjoined the states to obey privileges of citizens of the United States including those in the Bill of
Rights. TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (1867). But the provision was unenforceable and a dead letter. In the 1872 edition of his
work, Farrar acknowledged decisions holding states could violate guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
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states, it amended the federal Habeas Corpus Act to allow federal judges,
acting "within their respective jurisdictions. . . to grant writs of habeas
corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution.., or law of the United States.
346
The object of the statute, according to Senator Trumbull, Chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, was to protect a person held under state
law in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.
347 Of
course, the Act says nothing about which constitutional rights were pro-
tected against state action. Still, it further protected federal constitu-
tional rights from state denial. The Habeas Corpus Act provided a
mechanism by which a plan to require states to obey the Bill of Rights
could be enforced and realized. As John Bingham said in 1871:
Sir, before the ratification of the fourteenth amendment, the State
could deny to any citizen the right of trial by jury, and it was done.
Before that the State could abridge the freedom of the press, and it was
done in half the States of the Union ....
Under the Constitution as it is ... no State hereafter can imitate
the bad example ... of Georgia and send men to the penitentiary, as
did that State, for teaching the Indian to read the lessons of the New
Testament .... 348
In 1866, many in Congress seemed poised to readmit the Southern
states upon their ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 349 The Re-
publican party was not yet ready to insist on black suffrage. Republicans
He concluded that all those decisions were "entirely swept away" by the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Aynes, supra note 16.
George W. Paschal was a respected and conservative lawyer and law teacher. In his treatise,
he treated section one of the Fourteenth Amendment as applying the Bill of Rights to the states.
GEORGE W. PASCHAL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES DEFINED AND CAREFULLY
ANNOTATED 290 (1868). Paschal noted that the amendment defined citizenship. "All else in this
section," he said,
has already been guaranteed in the second and fourth sections of the fourth article; and in
the thirteen amendments. The new feature declared is that the general principles, which
had been construed to apply only to the national government, are thus imposed upon the
States. Most of the States, in general terms, had adopted the same bill of rights in their
own constitutions.
Id.
John N. Pomeroy, the prolific and respected New York University Professor of Law, said that
the Fourteenth Amendment would correct both Dred Scott, by securing constitutional protection to
blacks, and Barron, by requiring the states to obey the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. JOHN NOR-
TON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 147-
53 (1868). See also CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 16, at 173.
Thomas Cooley's 1868 Constitutional Limitations seems not to have addressed the meaning of
section one. THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (reprint 1987) (1868).
346. 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
347. GLOBE 39(1), supra note 68, at 4229.
348. GLOBE, 42(1) app., supra note 132, at 84.
349. JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 2-9 (1984);
ERIC L. McKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 359-61, 448-85 (1960).
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knew that without the black vote, their chances of controlling govern-
ments in the Southern states were slim. That meant, in effect, that the
only security for the rights of Republicans and their allies in the South
might be the guarantees of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Nothing heightens respect for the guarantees in the Bill of Rights so
much as the recognition that one may be the subject of prosecution. In
the 1860s Republican signers of the endorsement for a compendium of
Helper's book were being treated as criminals in the South. In February
1860, Abraham Lincoln exhorted Republicans not to be "frightened
[from our duty] by menaces of destruction to the Government nor of
dungeons to ourselves. ' 350 Indeed a major factor protecting Republicans
from prosecution was the fact that they were beyond the physical power
of the Southern states. By 1866 an endorser of the Helper book had
become the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Three of the seven
Republican House members of the Joint Committee that reported the
Fourteenth Amendment had endorsed the book.351 One of these three
was John Bingham. John Bingham and the other endorsers of the book
had personal and concrete experience with the importance of guarantees
of free speech and the other guarantees of the Bill of Rights. When Bing-
ham said that states would henceforth be required to respect these guar-
antees, it is likely that he meant what he said. To most Republicans at
least, such a "completion" of the constitutional plan was unlikely to be
controversial. 3
52
B. The Impending Crisis and Early Republican
Understanding of Free Speech
The controversy over Helper's book also gives some insight into
early Republican understanding of the guarantees of freedom of speech,
press, and religion. By the 1860s there was scholarly support for the idea
that the freedom of the press meant a guarantee against prior restraint. 353
350. LINCOLN'S SPEECHES 1859-1865, supra note 9, at 130, 150.
351. Schuyler Colfax was Speaker of the House. Ellihu B. Washburne, Justin S. Morrill, and
John A. Bingham were members of the Joint Committee who had endorsed the compendium. RE-
PORT OF THE JOINT COMMITFEE ON RECONSTRUCTION AT THE FIRST SESSION THIRTY-NINTH
CONGRESS iii (reprint 1969) (1866). For a list of Congressional endorsers, see, e.g., Hinton Helper's
Infamous Book-What the Sixty Eight Demand, RALEIGH REGISTER, Dec. 14, 1859, at 1.
352. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 16, at 48-49, 53, 90; FEHRENBACHER;
supra note 63, at 27.
353. See PASCHAL, supra note 345, at 256. Joseph Story seems both to embrace Blackstone's
analysis of prior restraint and to justify suppression of items adjudged at trial to have a "pernicious
tendency." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 703-
07 (reprint 1987) (1833). For a more libertarian approach to the subject and a rejection of the idea of
freedom of expression limited to protection against prior restraint, see COOLEY, supra note 345, at
414-30.
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Under that theory government could not censor books in advance of
publication but could punish the author after circulation. In the cases of
denial of free press complained of by Republicans, and certainly in the
case of Helper's book, the problem that confronted Republicans was sub-
sequent punishment, not prior restraint. Yet they repeatedly insisted
that such subsequent punishment also violated the rights to freedom of
speech and of the press.
After the Civil War and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court suggested that the Constitution protected the
right to assemble and to petition the Congress from interference from
any quarter, but did not protect free speech, assembly, or petition with
reference to state concerns. 354 The Court made a structural argument,
indicating that republican government by its very nature implied a right
to petition. 355 Some have suggested that Republican arguments for free
speech similarly might be limited to matters within the sphere of the na-
tional government. 356 (The first purely textual problem with this argu-
ment is that the Constitution provides in Article IV, Section 4, that the
United States shall guarantee to each state a "Republican Form of Gov-
ernment. ' 357 Leading Republicans in 1866 insisted that free speech and
other Bill of Rights guarantees were essential to a truly republican gov-
ernment. 358) It is hard to see how free speech could be isolated into state
and national boxes so as to eliminate free speech on matters of state con-
cern. No state, after all, is an island isolated from national issues, nor is
the nation isolated from state issues, as the battle over slavery shows.
The power to amend the Constitution means that all local issues are po-
tentially national ones. Before the passage of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Republicans in the Senate explicitly indicated that states should
not be permitted to deny free speech on domestic (local) as well as na-
tional issues.
On balance, the debates from the 36th, 38th, and 39th Congresses
do not support the idea that most Republicans thought a bifurcated read-
ing of freedom of expression was accurate or desirable. Republican com-
plaints about denial of free speech and press rights included matters both
directly related to the national government and those that were not. The
Helper book itself was basically addressed to elimination of slavery in the
slave states. Most Congressmen agreed that slavery, as a domestic issue
354. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
355. Id.
356. Fairman, supra note 16, at 96-97.
357. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
358. GLOBE 39(1), supra note 68, at 1072 (Sen. Nye); see also id. at 1629 (Rep. Hart).
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in the Southern states, was peculiarly a matter of state concern, a matter
over which Congress had no power. But the suppression of Helper's
book in the South, a book addressed to a matter of uniquely state con-
cern, was seen by Republicans as a flagrant denial of free speech and free
press.
Finally in 1859 and 1860 many Republicans championed a robust
view of free speech in the controversy over Helper's book. Like James
Madison at the time of the Sedition Act, they suggested a hard central
core to the First Amendment that included the right to discuss public
measures and public questions. And they supported this right even for
those who advocated conduct they considered barbarous and horrible-
human slavery and reopening the African slave trade. Implicitly at least
they rejected the idea that speech on such matters should be suppressed
because of its bad tendency. Indeed, one Republican showed Democrats
how easily the bad-tendency test could be manipulated to make
Southerners guilty of the kidnapping of free blacks in the North. He did
so, however, not to embrace the bad-tendency argument, but to support
his rejection of it.359 Of course, history is rarely uniform. During the
Civil War, Abraham Lincoln justified the arrest, military trial, and exile
of a Democratic politician who had made an antiwar speech. Lincoln
suggested that war-time emergency justified suppression of political ex-
pression with a tendency to cause desertion. Some post-Civil War judi-
cial decisions invoked the bad tendency test to punish political expression
that did not advocate violence. 36° Suppressions of free speech by the Lin-




The laws protecting slavery from criticism were really sedition acts
broadly defined. That indeed, was how supporters and opponents saw
them. They made it a crime to criticize one legal and social institution
and to advocate its abolition. Harry Kalven has suggested that freedom
cannot survive sedition acts-acts that make some political speech crimi-
nal. 362 The controversy over The Impending Crisis suggests that he was
359. GLOBE 36(1), supra note 2, at 763 (Sen. Hale).
360. MCPHERSON, supra note 318, at 58-60. For some post war bad tendency cases see, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Karvonen, 106 N.E. 556, 557 (Mass. 1914); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273,
276-77 (1915); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
361. MARK M. KRUG, LYMAN TRUMBULL: CONSERVATIVE RADICAL 207-08 (1965);
PALUDAN, supra note 121, at 149.
362. HARRY KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 15-16, 63-64 (1965).
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correct. This second controversy over seditious speech, however, was far
different from the first. This time the threat came from the states, not
from the national government, and for that reason arguments about the
lack of federal power to suppress speech were irrelevant. What was
needed to help prevent other episodes like the suppression of Helper's
book and other core political speech, was a set of national privileges
which no state could abridge. 363 Section one of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was intended to meet that need.
363. Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106
HARV. L. REV. 124, 140-42 (1992). See, CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 16. For
the retrospective views of Republicans who mentioned Worth's case, see GEORGE W. JULIAN,
POLITICAL RECOLLECTIONS (1840 TO 1872) 171-73 (reprint 1969) (1883); 2 HENRY WILSON, HIS-
TORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA 668 (reprint 1969) (1872).
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